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Abstract
Most countries are rapidly increasing the educational attainment of their workforce. This 
paper develops a novel framework to study, theoretically and empirically, the effects of an 
educational expansion on the occupational structure of employment and distinct aspects of 
the wage distribution— wage levels, wage gaps, and poverty and inequality indicators— with 
an application to Brazil. I proceed in three steps. First, I provide some stylized facts of 
the Brazilian economy between 1995 and 2014: A large educational expansion took place; 
the occupational structure of employment remained surprisingly fixed; workers of all edu­
cational groups— primary or less, secondary, and university—were increasingly employed in 
occupations of lower ranking as measured by average wages over the period; and wages of 
primary educated workers increased while wages of more educated workers declined, bring- 
ing forth reductions in poverty and inequality. Second, I build a model that traces these 
heterogeneous patterns of occupations and wages to the educational expansion. The model 
assigns workers with three levels of education to a continuum of occupations that vary in 
complexity and are combined to produce a final good. I investigate three different policy 
experiments: An increase in university level, an increase in secondary level, and a simultane- 
ous increase in both. The predicted effects depend on the policy analyzed. Considering the 
educational expansion that took place in Brazil (simultaneous increases in university and 
secondary levels), the model predicts qualitatively all the observed labor market changes in 
the occupational structure of employment and the wage distribution. Finally, I calibrate the 
model with the data from 1995 and show that, through its lens, the observed educational 
expansion in Brazil explains 66 percent of the occupational downgrading and around 80 per- 
cent of the changes in wage levels, inequality, and poverty during the period of 1995-2014.
JEL-codes: I25; J24; O15.
Keywords: Educational Expansion, Brazil, Labor Market, Wages, Occupations, Poverty, 
Inequality. *I
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1 Introduction
Increases in human capital through formal education are widely cited as a key driver of economic 
development (Hanushek & Woessmann 2008, 2012) . In the last decades, most countries have 
experienced a rapid increase in the educational attainment of their workforce. Between 1990 
and 2010 the worldwide average enrollment rates in secondary and university education grew 
by around 25 percentage points each (Barro & Lee 2013) . An educational expansion, defined 
as an increase in the share of workers with secondary and/or university education, raises the 
educational level of some workers while leaving that of others unchanged. Those workers that 
receive the additional education increase their human capital, earn higher wages, and have 
access to better jobs. But an educational expansion likely affects the rest of the workforce as 
well. An influx of more educated workers can result in labor market effects that reshape the 
occupational composition of employment (what jobs are available and who performs them) and 
the entire wage distribution (the wages for those jobs). These effects are commonly overlooked 
when designing an educational policy, and they are by no means obvious. For example, the 
workers who remain with low levels of education may be hurt if they are displaced to worse 
jobs, where wages remain stagnant or decline, or they may become better off if their wages 
increase as result of a higher demand for their jobs (generated by general equilibrium effects) 
coupled with a lower supply.
This paper provides a novel framework to study the effects of an educational expansion on 
the occupational structure of employment and distinct aspects of the wage distribution, both 
theoretically and empirically, with an application to Brazil. I proceed in three steps. First, 
I provide some stylized facts for Brazil on the inter-linkages between changes in education, 
occupations, and wages over the period of 1995-2014. Second, I build a theoretical framework 
that relates changes in occupations and wages to an educational expansion that is qualitatively 
consistent with the patterns observed in Brazil. Finally, I calibrate the model and assess if the 
predicted effects of the Brazilian educational expansion are quantitatively relevant to explain 
its labor market changes during the analyzed period. This theoretical and empirical framework 
is of particular relevance to study other developing countries where educational attainment has 
increased or is increasing very rapidly.
In the first part of my paper, I rely on Brazilian data from the Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra 
de Domicilios (PNAD) during the period of 1995-2014. An exceptionally large educational 
expansion took place during these years, which is reported to be one of the fastest expansions 
in history (Bruns et al. 2011) . The share of workers with secondary education doubled from 20.5 
to 40.0 percent, the share with university level grew from 11.3 to 23.6 percent, and the share of 
workers with only primary education or less halved from 68.1 to 36.4 percent. During this period, 
the occupational structure of employment of the entire economy remained surprisingly fixed, 
while there was lower occupational attainment within each of the educational group— primary or 
less, secondary, and university— defined as an increase in employment in occupations of lower 
ranking, this was especially pronounced for workers with secondary schooling.1 Despite this
XI rank ISCO -88 at 3-digit occupations between 0 and 1 according to the median wages over the entire period,
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common decline in occupational attainment across educational groups, changes in wages were 
heterogenous: Wages of primary educated workers increased (37.3 percent), wages of secondary 
educated slightly declined (10.5 percent), and wages of university educated largely fell (21.6 
percent), bringing forth reductions in poverty and inequality.* 2 These facts are puzzling: a 
much larger increase in employment of higher rank occupations is expected if labor markets 
are fragmented (workers with different educational levels participate in separated labor markets 
containing particular occupations); average wages are expected to fall for each group and fall 
more for medium educated workers, if there is lower occupational attainment for all groups and 
wages are tied to occupations.
For the theoretical model that I construct in the second part of my paper to explain these 
observed patterns, I build upon the Ricardian model proposed by Acemoglu & Autor (2011) . 
There is a unique good to be produced using an infinite number of occupations, which can 
be ordered by their level of complexity. There are three types of workers: low, medium, and 
high educated, which relate to the primary, secondary, and university educated workers in the 
data. Workers' types differ in their productivity of performing each occupation, so that there 
is an optimal assignment of workers' types to occupations. The key assumption of the model 
is that the comparative advantage of more educated workers relative to less educated workers 
increases with the complexity of the occupation. This assumption ensures positive assortative 
matching, where more educated workers are optimally assigned to more complex occupations.3 
The competitive equilibrium determines the following: 1) the occupational structure of employ- 
ment (the share of workers performing each occupation), 2) the assignment of workers’ types 
to occupations, and 3) the wages of each type of worker. I analyze the effects on these equilib­
rium outcomes under three alternative policy experiments: (i) an increase in the share of high 
educated workers through a decline in the share of low educated workers, (ii) an increase in 
the share of medium educated workers through a reduction in the share of low educated work­
ers, and (iii) an increase in the shares of both high and medium educated workers. I evaluate 
for each case the changes in the occupational structure of employment, overall and for each 
educational group, and various aspects of the wage distribution: average wages for each type 
of worker, growth incidence curves, poverty and inequality.4 I find that the predicted effects 
depend on whether the increase took place in high or medium education. When there is an 
increase in both, one of these effects will dominate depending on the extent of the changes in 
the relative supply.
The model qualitatively predicts all the observed labor market changes in the occupational
with 0 representing the occupation with the lowest wage and 1 representing the one with the highest wage. The 
average ranking diminished by 15.2 percent, 28.2 percent and 8.5 percent for primary, secondary and university 
educated workers, respectively, between 1995 and 2014.
2Reductions in inequality and poverty depend on the index being considered. For example, the Gini index 
declined by 0.085 points and the wage poverty rate (using a $2.4 wage poverty line) diminished by 16.4 percentage 
points.
3Positive assortative matching is another stylized fact in Brazil. In a given year workers with higher levels of 
education are more likely to be employed in occupations of higher ranking.
4 Growth incidence curves trace the anonymous winners and the losers for each percentile of the wage dis- 
tribution. Poverty is measured using a wage poverty line between initial wages of low and medium educated. 
Inequality is approximated by the wage gaps between the different groups and other indexes of inequality.
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structure of employment and the wage distribution for the policy experiment that resembles the 
educational expansion that took place in Brazil. The case of an increase in higher education 
provides a better intuition to understand the effects of the Brazilian educational expansion (a 
simultaneous increase in medium and high education). When the share of workers with high 
education increases, they become more abundant and their wages fall in the occupations that 
they were originally employed in, while the supply of low educated workers declined and their 
wages increase in the occupations where they were originally employed. Therefore, it becomes 
profitable for firms to start hiring high educated workers in occupations that were previously 
performed by medium educated workers and use medium educated workers in occupations 
previously performed by low educated workers, generating lower occupational attainment for 
each educational group. The changes in the occupational composition of employment of the 
whole economy are smoothed by more educated workers starting to perform occupations of lower 
complexity. Wages for high educated workers decline due to the increase in supply. Wages of 
low educated workers rise because of the decline in supply coupled with a higher demand for 
the occupations that they perform, given that the production of the rest of the occupations 
increased.5 Changes in wages of medium educated workers are always between those of low and 
high educated workers and these changes could be positive or negative (the negative effect of 
the lower occupational attainment is offset by an increase in the value of the new occupations 
that they perform). Inequality declines, as measured by wages gaps of more educated workers 
with respect to lower educated workers. Poverty diminishes as a larger share of the population 
has access to wages of more educated groups and wages of the remaining low educated workers 
increase. These patterns exactly match the stylized facts from Brazil.
In the third part of my paper, I examine how much of the observed changes in the data in 
Brazil can be explained by its educational expansion through the lens of the model. To that end, 
I calibrate the model using the data from 1995 as the baseline year. The calibration procedure 
is simple. The set of parameters that need to be estimated are the skill supplies and the 
productivity across occupations for each type of worker. The parameters corresponding to the 
educational level of the workforce come directly from the data. I use the average wages for low, 
medium and high educated workers in 1995 to estimate the technology parameters according to 
the equilibrium conditions in the model by making the identifying assumption that the relative 
comparative advantages across occupations are linear functions. Then, I estimate the effects 
on the equilibrium outcomes of the Brazilian educational expansion between 1995 and 2014. I 
simulate the effects of an increase of 19.5 and 12.3 percentage points in the share of workers 
with secondary and university level, respectively, holding fixed the rest of the parameters in the 
model. Finally, I compare the equilibrium outcomes in the model with that observed in the 
data before and after the educational expansion. I find that the educational expansion generated 
most of the quantitative changes observed in the data during the period of 1995-2014. It predicts 
38 percent of the (small) changes in the occupational structure of employment, 72 percent of
5Although the productivity to carry out each occupation does not change with an educational expansion for 
any group, there is an implicit complementarity in the production of the final good by combining occupations in 
a Cobb-Douglas production function with an elasticity of substitution equal to one.
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the lower occupational attainment for each educational group, 91 percent of the changes in 
wage levels of different educational groups and their corresponding wage gaps, 85 percent of the 
decline in wage inequality, and 68 percent of the reduction in wage poverty. I conclude that the 
increase in education was of utmost importance to the changes in the Brazilian labor market in 
the last two decades.
By using the calibrated model to run counterfactuals, I show that the effect of increases 
in education on average wages and total output declines rapidly with successive educational 
expansions when technology is fixed. I find that a further educational expansion over a much 
more educated workforce in 2014 will have less than a third of the effects it had in 1995 when the 
workforce was less educated. The reason for this is that more educated workers are increasingly 
employed in tasks of lower complexity, where their relative productivity diminishes, reducing 
the additional impact of the increase in education on the total output of the economy and, 
therefore, on average wages. From this exercise, I conclude that further educational expansions 
in Brazil will have a lower impact, and this is especially true for increases in medium education.
This paper contributes to the existing literature in several important ways. First, it relates 
to the literature that evaluates the labor market effects of an increase in education. To the best 
of my knowledge, this is the first paper to study the theoretical predictions of the effects of 
different educational expansions on the occupational structure of employment and the distinct 
aspects of the wage distribution in a general equilibrium framework accompanied by a quantita- 
tive assessment of these effects. Other papers that use a similar theoretical framework analyze 
a different set of outcomes, do not bring the model to the data, and are mainly concentrated 
on the effect of a technological change as opposed to an educational expansion ( Teulings 2005, 
Costinot & Vogel 2010, Acemoglu & Autor 2011) . Other models study the effect of an edu­
cational expansion in a subset of the outcomes analyzed here: wage premiums among workers 
with different educational level (Katz & Murphy 1992, Goldin & Katz 2009) , the occupational 
composition of employment (Fields 1974, 1995) , or the wage levels (Becker 1994, Moretti 2004a, 
Khanna 2015) . Second, this paper provides new evidence for the increase in education to be 
the main factor behind the changes in the wage distribution in Brazil between 1995 and 2014. 
By using a novel framework, this paper supports previous research finding that the increase 
in educational attainment declined wage inequality (Barros et al. 2010, Gasparini et al. 2011, 
López-Calva et al. 2016, Alvarez et al. 2017) , extending the analysis to other aspects of the 
wage distribution and the occupational composition of employment. Finally, this paper also 
contributes to the literature by reporting on distinctive patterns of changes in the occupational 
structure of employment that may arise in developing countries when education increases, con- 
trasting with the job polarization patterns that have been found in developed countries due to 
skill-biased technological change or to the falling cost of automating routine job tasks (Katz 
et al. 2006, Acemoglu & Autor 2011, Autor & Dorn 2013, Goos et al. 2014, Beaudry et al. 2016, 
Burstein et al. 2016, Deming 2017) .
In summary, this paper provides a theoretical framework that relates the observed changes 
in the occupational structure of employment and in the wage distribution in Brazil to its edu-
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cational expansión, developing a relatively simple method to quantitatively assess these effects. 
The framework is of particular relevance for developing countries where educational attainment 
of the workforce has increased or is increasing rapidly.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the related literature; 
Section 3 describes the data; Section 4 contains the stylized facts for Brazil; Section 5 introduces 
the model and the predictions of the model for different policy experiments; Section 6 calibrates 
the model with Brazilian data; Section 7 presents the results from the calibrated model; and 
Section 8 concludes.
2 Related literature
The model that I use in this paper is closely related to Acemoglu & Autor (2011) . I differ 
from them by shifting the focus of the analysis from the effects of technological changes towards 
the labor market effects of different policy experiments of educational expansions. To that 
end, I incorporate three dimensions. First, I modify the model to be more suitable to study 
educational expansions by adding the restriction of a measure of 1 of workers in the economy. 
Thus, if the number of workers in one group increases there must be a corresponding decline 
in the other groups.6 Second, I look at changes in a broader set of outcomes related to the 
entire wage distribution by studying real wages in addition to relative wages, which I use to 
evaluate the effects on different percentiles of the wage distribution and on wage poverty. Third, 
I provide an empirical strategy to calibrate the model and quantitatively assess the importance 
of changes in education on the observed patterns in the data. Teulings (2005) and Costinot & 
Vogel (2010) also use a similar assignment model to look at changes in the skill distribution of 
the labor force on the wage distribution and the occupational composition of employment, but 
do not refer to increases in education.7
Most of the existing literature on the labor market effects of an increase in education is 
concentrated either in its effect on the wage distribution or in the effects on occupations, but 
not both. A descriptive analysis of this literature can be found in Fields (1995) , who presents 
the labor market consequences of an educational expansion under different functioning of the 
labor market, distinguishing between two models. First, a model with fragmented labor markets 
by workers’ educational level, where wages fluctuate when supply or demand changes but the 
occupations that workers with different educational level perform is fixed (the standard textbook 
model). Second, a segmented labor market where wages in the high earning sector are fixed 
(and therefore a given number of positions available for each job) and education is a way to be 
hired preferentially for the best jobs available.8 In my model, wages and occupations (overall
6Acemoglu & Autor (2011) construct the model to study job polarization in the United States arising from 
technological changes. The restriction of a measure of workers is irrelevant in that context.
7These models include a continuum of workers skills which is not explicitly related to education. This makes 
the effects of changes in the distribution of skills difficult to interpret in terms of an educational expansion, and 
are harder to bring to the data.
8To consider fix wages in one sector of the economy is a common assumption in the literature about segmented 
labor markets or dual economies in development economics starting with Lewis (1954) and Harris & Todaro 
(1970) . Fields (1974) develops a related model assuming that educated workers are favored by employers and
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and for each educational group) are interlinked and simultaneously determined in equilibrium.
Another strand of the literature studies the effect of increases in education on wage premiums 
and inequality. It is a well known result that an increase in the relative supply of skills causes a 
decline in wage premiums if the technology is constant (Katz & Murphy 1992, Goldin & Katz 
2009, Gasparini et al. 2011, Acemoglu & Autor 2011) . This paper adds to the analysis of wage 
gaps by including the effects on real wages for each educational group, for different percentiles 
of the wage distribution, and the occupational structure of employment.
Other papers have empirically studied the effect of an educational expansion on wages of 
all educational groups by exploiting regional variation within the United States (Rauch 1993, 
Acemoglu & Angrist 2000, Moretti 2004a) . They find that an increase in the supply of college 
graduates raises wages for all educational groups, even for college graduates who experienced 
an increase in supply, attributing these effects to productivity spillovers generated by college- 
educated workers. I find that an increase in the share of high educated workers also raises the 
wages of low educated workers in Brazil, but that wages of high educated declines. The main 
reason for this discrepancy could be that the empirical strategy of these papers only captures 
small increases in the share of high educated workers, as opposed to the major increase that 
took place in Brazil where the supply effect is more likely to dominate. Another reason could be 
that productivity spillovers require directed technology changes for the educational group that 
now is more abundant (Acemoglu 2002) , which may take place over a longer period of time in 
developing countries than in developed ones.9
Another contribution of this paper is to provide evidence that the increase in education 
was the main factor behind the changes in the wage distribution in Brazil between 1995 and 
2014. There is a heated debate in the literature on the contributing factors to the decline in 
inequality and wage gaps of workers with different educational levels in Brazil. These factors 
include: educational upgrading that declined returns to education (Barros et al. 2010, Gasparini 
et al. 2011, López-Calva et al. 2016, Alvarez et al. 2017) ; increases in the minimum wage that 
spread throughout the wage distribution (Engbom & Moser 2017) ; and the fall in returns to 
experience which compressed the wage distribution (Ferreira et al. 2016) .10 In my results, the 
educational expansion observed in Brazil not only explains most of the changes in key aspects 
of the wage distribution, but it is also consistent with the changes in the occupational structure 
of employment in the analyzed years. My results can be related to the other channels that 
have been identified in the literature. For example, it could be possible that the increase in the 
minimum wage was effective in raising wages and did not decrease formal employment because 
the labor market for low educated workers became much tighter as a result of the supply and
hired in preference to the less educated for unskilled jobs.
9Khanna (2015) uses similar techniques of exploiting regional and cohort variation to evalúate the general 
equilibrium effect of an educational reform in India. He finds that the reform largely increased the share of high 
educated workers, increasing the wages of low educated workers and declining the wages of high educated workers. 
This is consistent with the supply effects dominating in developing countries at least in short or medium-run.
10Other studies focus on different factors. Ulysseas (2014) and Meghir et al. (2015) study the of formal-informal 
gaps. Alvarez (2017) analyzes agricultural wage gaps. Dix-Carneiro & Kovak (2015) look at the effect of the 
trade liberalization during the nineties. Adao (2015) relates the decline in inequality to shocks in commodity 
prices
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demand mechanisms generated by an educational expansión. Moreover, if returns to experience 
are larger in more complex occupations, returns to experience may have declined for each 
educational group because of the lower occupational attainment arising from the educational 
expansion. The relationship between these various sources of changes in the wage distribution 
constitutes an exciting research agenda.
This paper also contributes to the literature by reporting on distinctive patterns of changes 
in the occupational structure of employment that may arise in developing countries, contrasting 
with the job polarization patterns that have been found in developed countries. In the case of 
Brazil, the occupational structure has been particularly rigid and the educational expansion was 
mostly associated with lower occupational attainment, meaning that more educated workers are 
increasingly employed in occupations previously performed by lower educated workers. On the 
contrary, in developed countries the changes in occupational structure are characterized by a 
hollowing-out of middle-wage occupations, with a corresponding increase in low and high wage 
occupations, leading to job polarization (Katz et al. 2006, Goos et al. 2014) . The literature 
for developed countries focuses on occupational changes resulting from the rapid change in 
technology in a context where education is relatively fixed (Acemoglu & Autor 2011, Autor & 
Dorn 2013, Deming 2017, Beaudry et al. 2016, Burstein et al. 2016) .11 For developing countries, 
especially for Brazil and most of Latin America, education may have been the most important 
factor in shaping the occupational composition of employment given its rapid increase over the 
last decades (Cruces et al. 2017) .
Finally, I find that some educational expansions may generate lower occupational attainment 
across all educational groups. This result relates to the literature on overeducation (Leuven & 
Oosterbeek 2011) , where there is also an allocation problem of deciding which workers will 
perform which jobs (Sattinger 1993, 2012) , but there are mismatches arising from incomplete 
markets such as imperfect information or job-search frictions. In this literature, there are Pareto 
improvements to be made by switching workers across occupations, and policy interventions that 
ameliorate these frictions are desirable. In this paper, more educated workers also end up in 
occupations where their skills are less relevant (have a lower comparative advantage), but they 
are optimally assigned to those occupations and there is no wage or productivity gain to be made 
by switching workers across occupations. My finding indicates that more educated workers may 
be increasingly employed in occupations where their acquired human capital through formal 
education is less relevant. This lower occupational attainment results from labor market forces 
(demand and supply) acting in an environment where education increases and technology is 
fixed, as opposed to being originated by labor market frictions. *
n It is reasonable that the literature on occupational changes for developed countries has focused on techno- 
logical changes. In these countries, the expansion in education took place in the past century, and technological 
progress is the main force behind recent changes in the assignment of workers’ types to occupations and their 
corresponding wages. In particular, there is a special interest in the effects of labor-saving technologies that have 
polarized the labor market in developed countries (Autor 2014) .
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3 Data
This paper use data from the Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios (PNAD), a nation- 
wide household survey for the years 1995 to 2014. Workers are classified into low, medium and 
high educated. Low educated workers are those with completed primary education or less (less 
than 9 years of schooling). Medium educated workers are those with some or complete secondary 
education ( between 9 and 11 years of schooling). High educated workers are those with some 
or complete university or another tertiary education (more than 11 years of schooling).
Hourly wages are expressed in 2005 purchasing power parity (PPP) dollars, and are esti- 
mated by dividing monthly labor earnings by hours worked in the corresponding month. The 
analysis is performed on employed workers between 18 and 55 years old, and living in regions 
that have been surveyed throughout the entire period.12 Observations are re-weighted to hold 
constant the demographic composition within each educational group at the levels of 1995.13
Codes of different occupations are harmonized using the International Standard Classifi- 
cation of Occupations of 1988 (ISCO-88). In the household surveys occupations are classified 
according to the Classificagao Brasileira de Ocupagoes (CBO), which changed between PNAD 
1996-1999 and PNAD 2001-2014. I follow Salardi (2014) for recoding the occupations from the 
CBO for each period into ISCO-88 at 3 digits.
I follow the standard procedure in the literature of using the wage percentile rank of the 
occupation (Katz et al. 2006, Autor & Dorn 2013, Beaudry et al. 2016, Deming 2017) . The 
wage percentile rank is usually estimated using the mean wage of the occupation in the baseline 
year. I opt for a different rank procedure that is better suited for my analysis: the median wage 
percentile rank of occupations taking into account the entire period 1995-2014. I prefer to use 
the median instead of the mean to avoid the influence of outliers. Moreover, I use all years 
between 1995 to 2014 for three reasons. First, to have more observations in each occupation. 
Second, the rank is less susceptible to changes in the characteristics of the occupations that may 
impact wages of particular occupations.14 Third, the model below in Section 5 predicts that 
occupations have the same wage if performed by the same educational group in a given year so 
that differential changes in wages throughout the entire period will better reflect its ranking.
Occupations are usually considered in the literature as the best description a researcher has 
about the type of job a worker performs.15 Some occupations are assumed to be more complex 
than others. For example, the tasks performed by an electrical engineer are arguably of higher
12I exclude regions from rural north. These regions were incorporated in the sample in 2004.
13I follow DiNardo et al. (1996) by constructing 20 cells within each educational group: two genders, five 
age categories and two sub-levels of education. I fix the participation of each cell to the initial share in 1995. 
This procedure avoids confounding changes in average wages of a particular group with a change in its gender 
composition, its age structure, or the education level within each educational group. Results are robust to not 
implementing this re-weighting procedure and are available upon request.
14For example, clerks had a decline in their relative position when compared to other occupations because of 
the change in the task content of their job. Library, mail and related clerks were in percentile 51 in 1995 and 
declined to percentile 17 in 2014, while using my classification they are in percentile 27. Except for some extreme 
cases like this one, the percentile an occupation belongs is similar by using the wage in 1995, the wage in 2014 or 
the wage during the period 1995-2014. The correlation is above .9 among all these alternatives, and the results 
are robust to using different classifications and available upon request.
15See Autor (2013) for a detail discussion on the information content of occupations.
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complexity than that of a housekeeper. Although the tasks’ content of different occupations 
may differ in more than one dimension (for example, routine manual, routine cognitive, and 
non-routine cognitive tasks), the relative wage of an occupation is assumed to be an indicative 
summary of how complex that occupation is when compared to other occupations in the econ- 
omy. Therefore, to use wages to rank occupations provides useful information regarding their 
relative position in terms of how complex its tasks content is.16
4 Changes in the Brazilian labor market between 1995-2014
4.1 Education
During the 1995-2014 period, there was a major increase in the educational attainment of the 
Brazilian workforce. Table 1 shows the share of workers with low (primary or less), medium 
(some secondary) and high education (some university) in 1995 and 2014. The share of low 
educated workers decreased from 68.1 percent in 1995 to 36.4 percent in 2014, the share of 
medium educated increased from 20.5 to 40.0 percent, and the share of high educated workers 
rose from 11.3 to 23.6 percent. In only 19 years, the share of workers with medium and high 
educated doubled, while the share of low educated workers halved.17
To contextualize the extent and pace of the educational expansion that took place in Brazil, 
it is useful to compare it with changes in enrollment rates in the rest of the world over a similar 
period of time. Panel (A) of Figure 1 shows the changes in enrollment rates in secondary and 
university education across countries, according to the data from Barro & Lee (2013) . Brazil is 
the country with the largest increase in secondary school enrollment, going from 16.0 percent in 
1990 to 86.2 percent in 2010, closely followed by other Latin American countries and Portugal.18 
In university education, the enrollment rate in Brazil increased 20 percentage points, around the 
average of the countries considered in the data. The educational expansion in Brazil between 
1990 and 2010 was also large from a historical point of view for the country. Panel (B) in 
Figure 1 plots the evolution of enrollment rates since 1975. Except for a moderate increase 
in primary education, enrollment rates were practically constant in Brazil between 1975 and 
1990. From 1990 to 2010 enrollment in secondary schooling soared, while university enrollment 
increased steadily after 1995. The substantial increase in enrollment had an impact on the 
educational level of the labor force after the younger and more educated cohorts replaced older 
less educated cohorts in the labor market. According to Bruns et al. (2011) , the rise in the 
educational attainment of Brazil’s labor force since 1995 has been one of the fastest on record 
in history.
16This approach has been extensively used in the literature (Acemoglu & Autor 2011, Autor & Dorn 2013, 
Beaudry et al. 2016) . However, there is an increasing literature that further discriminate among different tasks 
within an occupation by matching occupations with other datasets with detail tasks’ information (for example, 
the Dictionary of Occupational Titles for the United States). This information is not available for the case of 
Brazil.
17The extent of the educational expansion is robust to using the share of total hours worked instead of the 
share of employed workers.
18The enrollment rate is defined as the ratio of students at a given level of schooling in the designated age 
group to the total population of that age group.
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Brazil implemented several important educational reforms to increase the educational level 
of the population in primary, secondary, and university education.19 Bruns et al. (2011) estimate 
that, as a consequence of these reforms, a six-year-old Brazilian child starting school in 2010 
from the bottom quintile of the income distribution will, on average, complete more than twice 
as many years of schooling that her parents have. Data from the PNAD shows the large increase 
in secondary schooling between 1995 and 2014: the share of the population between 20 and 24 
years old that finished secondary schooling increased from 24.0 to 63.3 percent during this 
period. Demand for higher education also skyrocketed. According to the data from Instituto 
Nacional de Estudos e Pesquisas Educacionais Anísio Teixeira (INEP), the number of students 
in tertiary education increased from 1.7 million in 1995 to 6.6 million in 2015. But the selection 
process became tougher: only 19 percent of the candidates where accepted 1995, as opposed to 
only 14 percent 2015. The number of candidates increased from 2.6 to 14.3 million. The supply 
and diversity of higher level institutions also increased. The number of institutions offering 
university/tertiary education went from 894 in 1995 to 2,364 in 2014.
Given the large educational expansion that took place in secondary and university level, it 
is a possibility that the quality of education went down in Brazil. On the contrary, the available 
evidence points out that the quality did not decline. In secondary education, the students’ 
scores in the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) increased slightly between 
2000 and 2015 in each of the evaluated subjects (science, mathematics, and reading), and the 
scores in 2009 first-order dominates those of the year 2000, with the highest increase taking 
place on the bottom quintile (Bruns et al. 2011) .20 The scores are low by OECD standards, but 
they have not deteriorated in a time of a large educational expansion, which has been recognized 
as a remarkable achievement (Bruns et al. 2011) . Regarding tertiary education, selection to top 
universities remains highly competitive, as was discussed previously. For example, the ratio 
of applicants to UNICAMP and USP (two of the largest universities in Brazil) is of 16 to 1. 
According to Instituto Nacional de Estudos e Pesquisas Educacionais Anísio Teixeira (INEP), 
approximatively 90 percent of the students in university/tertiary education attend an institution 
that applied some kind of selection in 2014.21
19Bruns et al. (2011) provide a detailed analysis of these reforms.
20PISA is regarded as one of the best measures of student outcomes. It allows comparison of results across 
countries and within a country in different periods.
21Changes in education quality can also be inferred by comparing data on wages of workers with the same 
educational level but that were educated at different periods. In the online Appendix B.1 I follow Bowlus & 
Robinson (2012) decomposition to disentangle what part of the changes in wages for each educational group is 
explained by a decrease in education quality (the quantity of human capital inherent to each education level) and 
which part corresponds to a decline in market prices. Intuitively, the procedure estimates changes in prices by 
looking at yearly changes in wages for workers aged 40-50 for which the quantity of human capital presumably 
does not change, and the changes in quality are estimated as the residual of the difference between total changes 
in wages and changes in prices. I conclude that practically all the changes on wages come from a change in the 
market price of human capital for each educational level, consistent with the human capital content within an 
educational level remained unchanged.
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4.2 Wage distribution
Along with the educational expansión, the wage distribution in Brazil changed in several im- 
portant ways between 1995 and 2014. Table 1 presents changes in different dimensions of the 
wage distribution. With respect to real wages, wages of low educated workers increased by
37.3 percent, while wages for medium and high educated workers fell by 10.5 and 21.6 percent 
respectively. Average wages increased by 27.8 percent during this period, drove by two factors, 
the increase in wages of low educated workers, and the large increase in the share of workers 
receiving wages of medium and high educated (the wage bill increased for these two groups 
despite the fall in average wages).
Wage inequality declined sharply in Brazil, contrary to what has happened in the United 
States since the 1970s. The wage gaps between workers with different educational level dimin- 
ished, and all the indexes of relative income inequality declined.22 In 1995, the average wage of 
high educated workers was 2.5 times those of medium educated, and 4.8 times the wage of low 
educated workers. These gaps declined to 2.2 and 2.7 in 2014, respectively. The Gini index went 
down 0.085 points, from 0.445 in 1995 to 0.360 in 2014. To better understand the importance 
of changes in wages for workers with different educational levels in the reduction of inequality, 
I compute other indexes that can be decomposed in between and within-group inequality. The 
Theil index diminished 0.109, with 20 percent of that fall explained by changes in inequality be­
tween the three educational groups— low, medium, and high educated— consider in this paper. 
The importance of the between-group inequality is larger in the case of the Atkinson index with 
an inequality aversion parameter equal to 2, which put more weight to changes at the bottom 
of the wage distribution. The index declined 0.132, with 59.2 percent of that decline due to 
falling inequality between workers with different educational level.
For any anonymous welfare function that is increasing in wages, the welfare level in Brazil 
increased during this period. Figure 2 display the cumulative density function (CDF) of wages 
in 1995 and 2014. It is easy to see that the wage distribution in 2014 first-order dominates that 
of 1995, therefore welfare increase for any welfare function belonging to the class of anonymous 
and increasing in individual wages (Saposnik 1981) .23 Because of the properties of first-order 
dominance, any wage poverty index for any line decreased between 1995 and 2014. This is 
depicted by considering a poverty line of 2.4: wage poverty rate fell from 62.4 to 46.2 percent.24
4.3 Occupational structure of employment
I find that the large educational expansion in Brazil was not matched by a corresponding 
occupational upgrading between 1995 and 2014. Table 2 displays the share of the workforce in 
each educational level in 1995 and its changes between 1995 and 2014 according to the 1 digit
22See Barros et al. (2010) for a detail characterization of the decline in inequality in Brazil.
23Usually welfare analysis is related to household per capita income. This paper is only concerned about labor 
market outcomes (note not household wellbeing) and the welfare analysis is done over the wage distribution.
24The 2.4 wage poverty line is ad hoc, but there is a rationale to use this level. It is the wage needed for 
a household composed of 4 individuals to be above the $4-dollar-a-day poverty line if the employed individual 
works 45 hours a week.
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ISCO-88 classification. The occupational categories are ordered from higher pay to lower pay 
according to their median wage during the period 1995-2014. The changes are characterized by 
a small increase in the share of employment in top ranking occupations and a short decline in 
low ranking occupations. The share of professionals (the higher paid category) grew, but other 
high paid categories declined (managers, legislators, and military occupations). In the middle 
of the distribution of occupations, the share of clerks increased, compensated by a decrease in 
technicians, plant and machine operators and craft and related trade occupations. Finally, the 
share of service workers ros eon the low end of the distribution, while the share of agricultural 
or other elementary occupations fell. Overall, it is striking that while the share of professionals 
and managers increased only 2.5 percentage points from 13 to 15.5 percent between 1995 and 
2014, the share of highly educated workers went up 12.3 percentage points from 11.3 to 23.6 
percent.
Small changes in the occupational structure of employment are also found when considering 
occupations at the 3-digit level. I construct a ranking based on the median wage of each 
occupation considering all households surveys from 1995 to 2014.25 The ranking of occupations 
allows to estimate statistics that are informative about changes in the occupational structure 
of employment. Table 2 shows the mean, median, and standard deviation of this ranking for 
1995 and 2014. It also displays the changes in the employment share of the bottom-third, the 
middle-third and the top-third of the ranking of occupations. I also follow Acemoglu & Autor 
(2011) and Autor & Dorn (2013) , among others, in estimating smooth regressions of the changes 
in employment share over the ranking of occupations, overall and for each educational group.
By looking across the rows of Table 2 for the total workforce, it becomes evident that the 
employment structure of occupations did not change much overall. The mean, median, and 
standard deviation of the ranking do not change. Furthermore, when occupations are divided 
into bottom-third, middle-third and top-third the shares of employment remained practically 
unchanged, which is consistent all movements across occupations happening among those of 
similar ranking. The locally weighted regression for the total workforce is shown in the blue 
line in Figure 3. The figure shows a small decrease in the share of employment in low ranking 
occupations and a similarly small increase in high ranking occupations. Note that the slightly 
positive slope in Brazil differs from to the U-shaped pattern that has been estimated for the 
United States and other developed countries (Acemoglu & Autor 2011, Goos et al. 2014) , where 
occupations in the middle declined and those at both ends of the occupational distribution 
increased in the last three decades.
The red line in Figure 3 displays the result of a thought experiment simulating the changes 
in occupations between 1995 and 2014 if workers with a given educational level in 2014 were 
distributed across occupations as in 1995. This exercise simulates how the occupational struc­
ture of employment would have looked like in 2014 if the increases in education did not change 
the assignment of workers' type to occupations. The employment share in low ranking occu- 
pations (the 40 percent of occupations with lower ranking) would have largely declined, and
25The ranking is robust to using other measures as well. For more details see Section 3 .
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the employment share would have increased for occupations at the middle and at the top of 
the ranking. The difference between the blue and the red line is due to the lower occupational 
attainment within each educational, defined as an increase of employment in occupations of 
lower ranking relative to a previous time to which I now turn.
The small changes in the occupational structure of employment for the total workforce 
coupled with a large educational expansion resulted in a deterioration of the occupational dis- 
tribution within each educational group, especially for medium educated workers. When looking 
at 1-digit occupations, the employment share in the five higher paid occupations declined for 
each educational type. It declined 5.0, 23.3, and 11.4 percentage points for low, medium, and 
high educated respectively. The lower occupational attainment becomes even more clear when 
looking at 3-digit level classification of occupations. In the case of low educated workers, the 
mean and the median rank declined, and the share employed in the bottom-third occupations 
increase 7 percentage points. For medium educated workers, the share in bottom-third occu­
pations increased by 24.9 percentage points. For high educated workers, there was an increase 
in bottom-third occupations of 9 percentage points. This lower occupational attainment is 
depicted in Figure 3. All educational groups lost employment shares in higher rank occupa- 
tions and increased their employment share in lower rank occupations, and the pattern is much 
stronger among medium educated workers.26
In summary, there was a very large educational expansion in Brazil between 1995 and 2014. 
Wages of low educated workers increased and wages of medium and high educated workers fell. 
Wage poverty and wage inequality declined. At the same time, the occupational structure of 
the employment of the Brazilian economy remained surprisingly stable during this period, while 
there was a large decline on occupational attainment for workers with of a given educational 
level.
5 A theoretical model
5.1 Environment
There is a unique final good, the economy is closed and there is no trade in tasks. The unique 
final good is produced by combining a continuum of tasks represented in the unit interval [0,1], 
with a Cobb-Douglas technology mapping tasks to the final good. All markets are competitive *I
26In the online Appendix B.2 I explore in more detail the relationship between changes in average wages of each 
educational group and their occupational composition of employment. Using the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition,
I disentangle what part of the changes in averages wages are due to an occupational composition effect (changes 
in the occupations workers perform) and what part is due to a pay structure effect (changes in wages within 
occupations). I find that for all workers the composition effect is small, consistent with small changes in the 
occupational composition of the economy; while the increase in wages is driven by higher wages at each occupation, 
especially those that started with a lower wage. I also find that all educational levels experienced a negative 
occupational composition effect, consistent with lower occupational attainment for each educational level. For 
low educated workers wages within each occupation largely increased, compensating for the negative composition 
effect, and average wages increased. For medium educated workers, wages increased only in a small number 
of occupations but not enough to compensate for the negative composition effect. In the case of high educated 
workers, wages declined within occupations, reinforcing the negative composition effect, and average wages largely 
fell.
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and the final good is chosen to be the numeraire. Let Y  denote the production of the unique 
final good and let y (i) be the production level of the task i, then:
r r 1
Y =  exp In y (i) di (1)
0
Each task i can be produced by using three types of workers— low, medium, and high 
educated— which are perfect substitutes. Workers’ types differ in their productivity to perform 
each task. Consider AJ to be the factor-augmenting technology of input J and aj (i) to be the 
task-specific productivity of input J in task i. The production of each task i is defined as:
y (i) = Al aL(i)L(i) +  Am aM (i)M  (i) +  Ah an (i)H (i) ,
where L(i), M (i) and H (i) are the amount of workers employed in producing task i with low, 
medium, and high education, respectively.27 I assume tasks can be ordered by a unidimensional 
level of complexity represented by the index i e  [0,1] , where 0 represents the less complex task 
and 1 stands for the most complex task. I further assume that the comparative advantage of 
more educated workers relative to less educated workers increases with the complexity of the 
task and they are continuously differentiable on i. That is,
daM (i)ah(i)
di > 0,
d aH£)aM (i)
di > 0. (2)
This is a key assumption of the model establishing the structure of comparative advan- 
tage across tasks. This assumption ensures positive assortative matching since more educated 
workers are optimally assigned to more complex tasks.
Let l, m and h be the share of low, medium, and high educated workers in the economy. 
There is no unemployment in the model. Factor clearing conditions require that:
(  L(i)di = l; M (i)di =  m; H (i)di = h.
0 0 0
Finally, I assume that there is a measure of workers equal to 1 in the economy,
(3)
l +  m +  h =  1; (4)
The labor supply for each of the three types can be defined by two parameters, e.g. h and m. 
When either h or m goes up there must be a corresponding decrease in the share of workers with 
another level of education. This is the most significant difference between the environment of 
my model and that of Acemoglu & Autor (2011) . This restriction is a fundamental feature of an 
educational expansion where some percentage of the workforce will move from one educational 
level to the another, increasing the supply of a more educated group by reducing the supply of 
a less educated group.
27Because of the assumption of a measure 1 of workers, L(i), M(i )  and H(i)  are interpreted as the share of 
the population with a specific level of education employed in task i .
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The competitive equilibrium in this economy consists of an assignment of workers’ types to 
tasks, an overall distribution of employment, and real wages for each type of worker, such 
that producers maximize profits and labor markets clear, given the supply of skills and the 
productivity across tasks of each type of worker.
The equilibrium conditions in this model are similar to those in Acemoglu & Autor (2011) 
and its derivations are detailed in Appendix 1. The equilibrium is easy to characterize given the 
positive assortative matching that arises from the supermodularity in the production function 
and the assumption that the comparative advantage of more educated workers with respect to 
less educated workers is increasing in i. In particular, there exist two thresholds that determine 
which tasks are carried out by low, medium and high educated workers. Restating Lemma 1 
from Acemoglu & Autor (2011) :
Lemma 1. In any equilibrium there exist {Il ,Ih } G (0,1) with Il < Ih such that for any 
i < Il, L(i) > 0 and M (i) =  H (i) =  0; for any Il < i > Ih , L(i) = H (i) =  0; and M (i) >  0, 
and for any i > Ih , L(i) = M(i) =  0 and H(i) > 0.
These thresholds naturally arise from the assumption that comparative advantage is in­
creasing in i, generating positive assortative matching. Intuitively, it is optimal for employers 
to use the most productive workers (high educated) to the more complex tasks (closer to the 
index 1), where they have a larger comparative advantage. On the opposite, it is in their profit- 
maximizing interest to employ low educated workers in the tasks of low complexity (closer to 0). 
And finally, medium educated workers will be employed in the remaining task with a medium 
level of complexity. The location of these thresholds depends on the relative supply of work- 
ers’ types and on their relative productivities in each task, both of which are assumed to be 
exogenous in the model.
In equilibrium, thresholds Il and Ih are obtained by solving the following system of equa- 
tions:
5.2 Equilibrium
(Ih -  Il) aL(lL) = Am m 
Il aM (Il) Al (1 -  m -  h) (5)
(1 -  Ih ) aM (Ih ) =  AH _h (6)
Ih -  Il aH(Ih) Am m
Equation (5) follows from equalizing the cost of producing task Il with low and medium 
educated workers. It states that there is no profit to be made by employers in switching 
workers with medium and low education across tasks. Similarly, equation (6) comes from 
equalizing the cost of task Ih if produced by medium or high educated workers. These equations 
provide a unique mapping between the thresholds Ih and Il , and the relative supply and 
relative productivities of low, medium, and high educated workers across different tasks. These 
thresholds are uniquely determined. To see this, consider the case of equation (5) . If Il is
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equal to zero, the left-hand-side (LHS) goes to infinite; if IL is equal to IH the LHS is equal 
to zero. The LHS is decreasing in IL given the assumption that more educated workers are 
more productive in more complex tasks; the right-hand-side is positive and does not depends 
on IL. Taken together, there is a unique value of IL € (0 ,1#) that solves (5) , given a value of 
Ih . Using similar arguments, there is a unique value of I# € (Il , 1) that solves equation (6) . 
Finally, there is a unique pair IL,IH € (0,1) that solves both equations simultaneously.
Let AVP  be the average productivity in the production of tasks in the economy. CHM(i) 
be the comparative advantage of high with respect to medium educated workers at task i, and 
Cm l (í) be the comparative advantage of medium relative to low educated workers at task i. 
Wage levels can be express in terms of AVP , CHM(IH), CML(IL) and the thresholds levels IH 
and Il , that is:
Equations (7)- (9) arise from the assumption of competitive labor markets, where workers of 
the same type earn the same wage, which is equal to the value of their marginal product.28
The wages for each type of worker have two components, one is common for all workers and 
the other contains two terms that are specific to each type of worker. The common factor is the 
average productivity of tasks’ production in the economy. The type-specific component adds 
(subtracts) to the average labor productivity depending on how more (less) productive workers 
of a type are in the task thresholds, weighted by the number of tasks each type performs.
From taking the difference of equations (7)- (9) , the wage gaps in the model are equal to the 
productivity differential at the task thresholds. That is:
ln  W #  -  ln  W m  =  C h m  ( I h ) (10)
ln W m  -  ln W l  =  C m l ( I l ) (11)
ln  W #  -  ln  W l  =  C h m  ( I h  ) +  C m l ( I l ). (12)
28Each task i in this economy will have a price that will exactly compénsate for the difference in labor pro­
ductivity with any other task i' that is produced by the same type of worker. For example, p(i)aH(i ) =  
p(i')aH(i') V {i, i'} € (IH, 1), where p(i) is the price of tasks i . See Appendix 1 for more details.
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F in a lly , t e t  E, b e  th e  e m p lo y m e n t  in  e a ch  ta sk . I t  ca n  b e  d e fin e d  as:
(13)
Equation (13) implies that employment is the same among tasks performed by the same type 
of worker. This result follows from the Cobb-Douglas technology of the production function 
with a unitary elasticity of substitution, which implies that expenditure across all tasks must 
be equalized in order to minimize cost, and the fact that task’s prices produced by a given type 
exactly offset the workers’ productivity differential.29 These expressions, together with (5) and 
(6) , imply that L > M > H , which means that the employment share in tasks performed by 
low educated workers (those of lower complexity) is higher than the employment share in tasks 
performed by medium educated workers, which in turn are higher than those of high educated 
workers. The intuition is that because high educated workers are more productive in all tasks, 
employers find it profitable to use them in a broader set of tasks.
An intuitive depiction of the equilibrium is shown in Figure 5. The figure contains the level of 
task complexity (i) on the horizontal axis and the relative productivities in the vertical axis. The 
thresholds IL and IH define the assignment of workers’ types to tasks, such that low educated 
workers perform tasks below IL, medium educated workers those between IL and IH, and high 
educated workers carry out the most complex tasks above IH. The function that defines the 
comparative advantage across tasks, CHM(i) and CML(i), are increasing in the complexity of 
the task defined by i, and relative wages are defined by the comparative advantage (relative 
productivity) among different types at the thresholds IL and IH.
All the outcomes of interest in this paper are defined by equations (5)- (13) . They determine: 
the distribution of workers’ type to tasks; the wage levels for each type; the wage gaps between 
types; and the employment distribution of tasks in the economy. I now turn to the question of 
how an educational expansion affects these outcomes.
5.3 Labor Market Effects of an Educational Expansión
An educational expansion in the model is defined as:
Educational expansión: There exist an educational expansion between time t and t' if m't > 
mt and h't > ht, with at least one of those relationship holding with strict inequality.30
In order to study the changes in the task composition of the economy, it is useful to de­
fine bottom-level, middle-level and top-level tasks according to whether they were originally 
performed for low, medium or high educated workers, respectively, before the educational ex­
pansion took place. These employment levels are represented by EB, EM, and ET.
29The equal expenditure of producers across tasks follows from the dual problem of minimizing costs for a 
given level of production. For more details see Appendix 1.
30In the rest of the paper the subscript t is dropped to ease notation.
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The summary of the labor markets effects of different educational expansions is shown in 
Table 3. I study 3 policy experiments of educational expansions: (i) an increase in h by declining 
l; (ii) an increase in m by declining l; and (iii) an increase in both m and h. Case (iii) is a 
mixture of the first two cases and can be further divided into two sub-experiments (iii.a) or 
(iii.b) depending on whether it is case (i) or case (ii) that dominates.
The effects of an educational expansion on the equilibrium conditions of the model are solved 
sequentially: equations (5) and (6) first determine the distribution of workers to tasks and, 
combined with equation (13) , determine the overall employment composition of the economy. 
These equations only depend on the relative supply of skills, which changes with the educational 
expansion, and the comparative advantages across tasks, which is assumed to be fixed. Then, 
equations (7)- (12) determine the new wage levels and relative wages, depending on the new task 
thresholds and holding fix the technology of the economy. In other words, I first determine the 
effect of each policy experiment on the task thresholds, and the effects on wages follow from it.
I postulate one proposition for each policy experiment (i)-(iii).
P rop osition  1 Under the policy experiment (i), the share of high educated workers increases 
from h to h' with a corresponding decline in the share of low educated such that Ah = h' — h = 
—Al >  0, holding the share of medium educated constant, generating:
(1.1) Changes in thresholds: I'L < IL, I'H < IH;
(1.2) Changes in the occupational structure: AEB > Al, AEM < 0, and AET < Ah;
(1.3) Changes in real wages: AWL > 0, AWH < 0, and AWH < AWM < AWL;
(1.4) Changes in relative wages: { A , A , A } < 0.
Proof: See Appendix A.3.
Condition (i.1) indicates that, under policy experiment (i), all workers’ types end up more 
concentrated in occupations of lower complexity than before (lower occupational attainment). 
Condition (i.2) establishes that the employment share of low-level occupations declines less than 
the reduction in the share of low educated workers because some medium educated workers 
start to carry out some of these tasks. Similarly, the employment share in top-level occupations 
increases by less than the change in the share of workers with high education because some 
of these workers start to perform medium-level tasks. Conditions (i.3) and (i.4) result from 
the general equilibrium effects of changes in supply and demand for workers with different skill 
levels.
These results are intuitively appealing. When the share of high educated workers increases, 
they become more abundant and their wages fall in the tasks they were originally employed, 
while low educated workers become less abundant and their wages increase in the tasks where 
they were originally employed. Therefore, it becomes profitable for firms to start hiring high ed­
ucated workers on tasks previously performed by medium educated workers, and to use medium 
educated workers in tasks previously performed by low educated workers. Then, all workers’
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types end up more concentrated in occupations of lower complexity than before (lower occupa- 
tional attainment). The changes in the tasks composition of employment of the whole economy 
are smoothed by more educated workers starting to perform occupations of lower complexity. 
Wages for high educated workers decline because of the increase in supply. Wages of low edu­
cated workers rise because of the decline in supply coupled with a higher demand for the tasks 
they perform, given that there is an increase in production of other tasks in the economy.31 
Changes in wages of medium educated workers are always between those of low and high edu­
cated workers and it could be positive or negative (the negative effect of the lower occupational 
attainment is offset by an increase in the value of the new tasks they perform). Wages gaps 
of more educated workers with respect to lower educated workers decline. The workers that 
benefit the most from an increase in the share of high educated are those who get educated 
(their wages raise to those of high educated workers), but also the remaining low educated for 
which wages increase. The workers that are hurt the most are those that already were high 
educated.
Panel (A) in Figure 6 displays some of the effects of policy experiment (i). When the 
share of higher educated workers increase, their wages decline and it becomes profitable for 
employers to use them in tasks of lower complexity (decline in IH), moving medium educated 
workers downward in the occupational ladder which in turn also displaced low educated workers 
towards tasks with lower complexity (decline in IL). Wage gaps decline given the fall in the 
comparative advantages of higher to medium and that of medium to low educated workers at 
each threshold.
P rop os ition  2 Under the policy experiment (ii), the share of medium educated workers in­
creases from m to m' with a corresponding decline in the share of low educated such that 
Am  =  m' — m = —Al > 0, holding the share of high educated constant, generating:
(11.1) Changes in thresholds: I'L < IL, I'H > Ih , (I'h — I'l) > (Ih — Il), and (I'L +
I 'l)/2  ^  (Il +  Ih)/2;
(11.2) Changes in the occupational structure: AET > 0, AEB > Al, and AEM < Am;
(11.3) Changes in real wages: AWM < 0, and {A W L, A W H} ^  0 >  AWM;
(11.4) Changes in relative wages: AWH/WM > 0, AWM/WL < 0, and AWH/WL ^  0.
Proof: See Appendix A.3.
Condition (ii.1) establishes that low educated workers are displaced to occupations of lower 
complexity, high educated workers are employed in more complex tasks, medium educated 
workers take over a larger number of tasks in the middle of the tasks distribution such that 
the average task that they perform may increase or decrease.32 Condition (ii.2) follows from
31Although the productivity to perform each task does not change with an educational expansión for any 
group, there is an implicit complementarity in the production of the final good by combining occupations in a 
Cobb-Douglas production function with an elasticity of substitution equal to one.
32The average task is informative of how complex are the jobs each worker is performing, and it can be compared 
to the average occupational ranking in the data for each educational group.
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condition (ii.1). It shows that the employment share in top-level tasks increase because a share 
of medium educated workers is incorporated into these tasks. Similarly, employment share in 
bottom-level tasks declines less than the reduction in the share of low educated workers because 
some medium educated workers start carrying out some of these tasks. Because some share of 
medium educated workers start to perform tasks they did not use to do, changes in employment 
in medium-level tasks are lower than the increase in the share of medium educated workers. 
Condition (ii.3) and (ii.4) result from the general equilibrium effects of changes in supply and 
demand for workers with different skill levels. Wages of medium educated workers decline, while 
wages of the other groups may increase or decrease but the changes are always higher than the 
decline in wages of medium educated. The changes in real wages decline of wage gaps between 
medium and low educated, and an increase in the wage gaps of high to medium educated.
These results can be intuitively interpreted as follows. When the share of medium educated 
workers increases, they become more abundant and their wages fall. It becomes profitable 
for employers to start using them in tasks previously performed by low and by high educated 
workers. Therefore, there is an expansion of the number of tasks carried out by medium ed- 
ucated. As the tasks performed by medium educated expands, there is a displacement of low 
educated workers towards tasks of lower complexity and of high educated workers to tasks of 
higher complexity. The employment share in top-level tasks expands because there is an influx 
of medium educated workers on these tasks. In terms of wages, the supply effect dominates 
for medium educated and their wages decrease. For low and high educated workers, wages can 
increase or decrease. For high educated workers, they are now concentrated into more complex 
tasks for which they are more productive, but the price for these tasks diminishes because of 
an increase in the amount produced. Therefore, the value of their marginal product (because 
we assume markets are competitive, wages equal the value of their marginal product) may in­
crease or decrease. On the contrary, low educated workers are now concentrated in tasks of 
lower complexity, where they are less productive (although having the comparative advantage 
on those tasks, productivity is assumed to increase with the complexity of the task). But the 
prices for these tasks may increase (they are relatively more scarce than before). The value of 
their marginal product (wages) may increase or decrease depending on which effect is stronger. 
Relative wages of medium with respect to other workers decline given the larger drop in its 
wages, while that of high educated with respect to low educated may increase or decrease. The 
workers that benefit the most from an increase in the share of medium educated are those who 
get educated (their wages raise to those of medium educated workers) and the workers that are 
hurt the most are those that already have medium education (their wages will have the largest 
fall).
Panel (B) in Figure 6 depicts the effects of policy experiment (ii). As medium education 
expands, wages for medium educated workers decline and they start to perform a broader set of 
tasks in the economy, pushing low educated workers towards tasks of lower complexity (decline 
in II) and driving high educated workers to tasks of higher complexity (increase in Ih ). The 
wage gaps of medium to low declines and that of high to medium educated increases (there is
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movement along the curves Cml and Chm respectively).
Proposition 3 Under the policy experiment (ni), the share of médium and high educated work- 
ers increases from m to m' and from h to h', with a corresponding decline in the share of low 
educated, such that Am  =  m' — m > 0, Ah =  h' — h > 0, and Am  +  Ah =  —A l , generating:
(111.1) AIh ^  0. If AIh > 0 it must be the case that mf  > m.
(111.2) If AIh < 0, preposition 1 holds.
(111.3) If AIh > 0, preposition 2 holds.
Proof: See Appendix A.3.
If the share of medium and high educated workers increases at the same time, there is 
a mixture of the two cases discussed above. Condition (iii.1) shows that the threshold that 
separates the tasks of medium and high educated workers may increase or decrease, depending 
on the extent of the changes in relative supply and on the technology reigning the production 
function in the economy. It also establishes that for Ih to increase it is necessary (but not 
sufficient) that the relative supply of medium with respect to high educated workers increases. 
Conditions (iii.2) and (iii.3) determine that the changes in the equilibrium of the model are 
dominated by the increase in h or the increase in m depending on the directional change in Ih . 
In other words, which one dominates depends on whether in the new equilibrium high educated 
workers displace medium educated workers towards tasks of lower complexity (A Ih <  0, effect 
of increase in high education dominates), or if middle educated workers displace high educated 
workers in some of the tasks they used to perform (A Ih >  0, effect of increase in medium 
education dominates).
By looking at propositions 1,2 and 3 and across columns of Table 3, there are some com- 
mon patterns of adjustment across all the policy experiments. First, there is a decline of the 
occupational attainment for low educated workers under any educational expansion (Il always 
decreases). Second, the changes in the occupational composition of employment are smooth 
when compared to changes in the educational composition of employment, due to changes the 
assignments of workers' types to tasks when there is an educational expansion in the economy. 
Finally, wages always decline for at least one educational group.
Corollary l : When any educational expansion takes place, there is always a decline of 
the occupational attainment for low educated workers, smooth changes in the occupational 
composition of employment, and a decline in wages for at least one educational group.
5.4 Welfare analysis: changes in the CDF of the wage distribution, poverty 
and inequality
This section studies the effects of different policy experiments on the wage distribution by 
looking into cumulative density functions (CDF), growth incidence curves (that reflect wage 
changes at each percentile of the anonymous wage distribution) poverty and inequality. In the
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model, the CDF is estimated using the share of workers with different educational level and 
their respective wages, before and after each educational expansion. Some of the directional 
changes in wages are ambiguous and depend on the parameters of the model, according to 
prepositions 1-3. When this is the case, there are two opposite forces pushing wages up and 
down. Wages in those cases may not change much due to the compensating forces. In this 
section, I make a simplifying assumption that wages remain at a similar level than before the 
educational expansion when the model provides ambiguous predictions. Figure 7 shows the 
CDF before and after the educational expansion for each policy experiment. The changes in 
CDF are better characterized by the growth incidence curves of wages (GIC), which captures 
graphically the wage changes for every anonymous percentile of the wage distribution. Figure 
8 depicts the GIC for each policy. It shows the absolute change in wages in the vertical axis 
and the percentile of the wage distribution (divided by 100) in the horizontal axis. The label 
“ J '” (prime) symbol indicates the value of variable J after the corresponding policy experiment.
Panel (A) in Figures 7 and 8 displays the effect policy experiment (i). An educational 
expansion in high education increases wages across the entire wage distribution, except for 
the wages at the top, those that originally where high educated. The new high educated 
workers move up in the wage distribution on top of those with medium education, increasing 
the educational level of most percentiles in the middle of the wage distribution. There is an 
increase in wages for the lower percentiles that remain with low education (L), as predicted 
by the model. Although the share of medium educated workers does not change, they move 
to the left of the wage distribution, increasing the wages of percentiles that move from being 
low to medium educated (L ^  M ). Some percentiles remain medium educated and wages 
could increase or decrease (M ), and are depicted by a dashed line. Wages for percentiles the 
move from medium to high educated increase (M  ^  H ) because more educated workers have 
higher earnings (albeit the fall due to the educational expansion). Finally, the wage falls for 
the percentiles that already were high educated located at the top of the distribution (H ).
Panel (B) shows the effects of policy experiment (ii). With an expansion in medium educa­
tion, the wages of percentiles that were originally low educated and are now medium educated 
(L ^  M ) increase to the new level of medium educated wages (W'M — WL), while that of per­
centiles that were already medium educated (Mi) decline as predicted by the model. The changes 
in wages for those percentiles that remain low and high educated (L and H , respectively) are 
ambiguous. It is clear from the figure which anonymous percentiles benefit and which are hurt 
with an educational expansion in medium education. Not surprisingly, the percentiles where 
the educational level increases benefit by a rise in their wages, while percentiles that already 
had wages of medium educated are hurt with the fall in wages as supply increases.
Panel (C) presents the effect of policy experiment (iii) when the increase in supply of high 
educated dominates (case iii.A in Table 3) . The effects in the wage distribution are similar to 
those in Panel (A), with the only difference of a larger share of percentiles that were originally 
low educated are now medium educated (L ^  M ).
Finally, Panel (D) shows the effect of policy experiment (iii) when the increase in medium
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education prevails (case iii.b in Table 3) . In addition to the effects in Panel (B), there is an 
increase in the wage of percentiles that become high educated (M ^  H ). Note that the larger 
the increase in the share of high educated the smaller the number of percentiles that remain 
medium educated (M ). If the increase in high educated is large enough, these percentiles for 
which wage diminishes disappear (Ah >  m). This is the only policy experiment in the context 
of the model where a wage distribution after an educational expansion can first order dominate 
the original wage distribution.33
Looking across panels of Figures 7 and 8, I find that an educational expansion concentrated 
in medium education mostly changes the middle of the wage distribution, while an educational 
expansion concentrated in high education reshapes the entire wage distribution.
I now turn to the welfare analysis. Because an educational expansion always declines the 
wages of at least one educational group (see corollary 1), in most educational expansions there 
is no welfare improvement characterized by a first order dominance. But a first order domi- 
nance is a very demanding welfare criteria to evaluate the policy experiments analyzed here. 
A  more practicable welfare analysis can be performed by constructing an abbreviated welfare 
function, with welfare depending negatively on poverty and inequality, and positively on the 
total production of the economy. Next, I analyze the predictions of the model on these three 
relevant outcomes.
Changes in poverty follow from the changes in the CDF of the wage distribution depicted in 
Figure 7. The poverty rate is defined as the percentage of workers below a wage poverty line. If 
the wage poverty line is anywhere between WL and WM, the poverty rate declines under policy 
experiments (i) and (iii.a), but it may increase in policy experiments (ii) and (iii.b) if the new 
wage for medium educated workers is below the wage poverty line. Note also that other poverty 
indexes that aggregate poor individuals according to how far they are from the poverty line will 
also decline under policy experiment (i) and (iii.a), given the increase in wages of those that 
remain in poverty (workers with low education, considering that the wage poverty line is lower 
than their new wage level). This is not ensured in experiments (ii) and (iii.b) because wages of 
low educated workers may fall and the gap between wages and the poverty line may increase.
In terms of inequality, the most natural measures of inequality in this context are the wage 
gaps. Inequality declines under policy experiments (i) and (iii.a), given that all wage gaps 
diminish. For policy experiments (i) and (iii.b), changes in inequality are ambiguous due to a 
decline in one wage gap (WM/WL) and an increase in another (WH/WM).
Finally, total production increases with any educational expansion.34 This result arises from 
the assumption that more educated workers also have absolute advantage in the production 
of tasks, so that a more productive labor force that is fully employed under the equilibrium 
conditions of the model always produces more output.35
Corollary 2: Without considering the cost of education, an educational expansion that
33It is also necessary that the parameters of the model are such that the changes in wages of low and high 
educated workers, which are ambiguous in the model, are not negative.
34Given that there is a measure of workers equal to 1, total production is equal to production per worker.
35The formal proof will be part of the appendix in a future version of the paper.
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increases in the share of high educated workers (or when it dominates) always improves welfare 
measured by an abbreviated social welfare function which depends on poverty (negatively), in- 
equality (negatively), and total output (positively). This may not be the case of an expansion 
in the share of medium educated workers (or when it dominates).
5.5 The importance of the comparative advantage across tasks
This section discusses the importance of the shape of the comparative advantage across tasks 
for the effects of the different policy experiments on occupations and wages. To that end, I 
evaluate the effects of an increase in high education. The only assumption in the model related 
to the comparative advantages across tasks is that it must be a function that is continuous, 
differentiable, and increasing in i, according to equation (2) . The slope of this relationship is 
crucial to determine the effects of an educational expansion. In particular, if the comparative 
advantages are steep, the changes in the thresholds are small and the changes in wages are 
large. On the contrary, if the comparative advantages are flat, an educational expansion results 
in large changes in the thresholds and small changes in wages.
To see this, consider four different combinations of comparative advantage schedules. The 
comparative advantage of high educated with respect to medium educated workers, CHM(i), 
could largely or barely increase with i. Let each of these cases be steep CHM(i) and flat CHM(i), 
respectively. Similarly, define two cases for the comparative advantage of medium with respect 
to low educated, steep CML(i) and flat CML(i). There are four possible combinations of steep 
and flat comparative advantages across tasks. A numerical example of the labor market effects 
of an increase in h under each of the four cases is presented in Table 4 and depicted in Figure 
9.36
By looking across columns, it is clear that in the case of flat comparative advantages, an 
educational expansion produces large changes in occupations and small changes in wages. On 
the contrary, in the case of steep comparative advantages, an educational expansion mainly 
affects workers' wages, with a small impact in their assignment to different occupations. If the 
curves are flat, employers find it profitable to use the more abundant high educated workers 
in many new tasks that were previously performed by medium educated workers, with only a 
small cost in terms of relative productivity on those tasks. In other words, the demand for 
high educated workers is more elastic due to the easiness of switching to occupations of lower 
complexity for which they are almost as productive as in the occupations they were originally 
performing. When the comparative advantages are steep, wages have to diminish sharply before 
employers find it profitable to start employing high educated workers in a small number of tasks 
of lower complexity. In this case, the labor demand is more inelastic and wages react more to
36The table and figure show the effect of an increase in h of 10 percent points, from 0.2 to 0.3. The rest of 
the parameters are fixed and they are defined as follows: m =  0 .4, A H =  4, A L =  2, A M =  2 .5. In the flat 
scenario,aL =  1 +  0 .0001 * i; a M =  1 +  0 .01 * i, a H =  1 +  0 .05 * i. In the steep scenario, a L =  i ; a M =  i2, 
a H =  i3, while A l , A m , and A H are estimated so that the thresholds and the initial wage is the same than in 
the flat scenario.
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ch a n g e s  in  su p p ly .
6 Calibration
The procedure to calibrate the parameters of the model with data from Brazil is fairly simple. 
The set of parameters that need to be estimated are the skill supplies and the productivity 
across tasks for each worker type. I used the baseline year, the PNAD survey of 1995, to 
calibrate all these parameters.
The parameters corresponding to the educational level of the workforce come directly from 
the data. The values of l, m, and h are the share of the employed workers with low (less than 
secondary), medium (some secondary), and high education (some university) in the survey of 
1995.
What remains to be estimated are the factor-specific augmenting technologies common to 
all tasks A L, AM and AH, and the specific productivity across tasks aL(i), aM(i) and aH(i). 
To that end, I use the average wages for low, medium and high educated workers in 1995. My 
identifying assumption is to assume a functional form for the functions aL(i), aM (i) and aH(i) 
that largely simplify the equilibriums conditions in the model.
With wage gaps and relative supplies in 1995 it is possible to estimate the thresholds levels 
IL and IH from the equilibrium conditions of the model. From equations (6) , (5) , (10) , and 
(11) , it is possible to express:
(14)
where IL and IH are the task thresholds in 1995. In terms of Figure 5, it solves for the 
thresholds levels and the wage gaps corresponding to each threshold. The function that goes 
through the point where the thresholds meet with the relative wages, which determines the 
relative productivities across all tasks defined as Chm (i) and CML(i), is estimated next. I 
assume a functional form for these functions. In particular:
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(15)
The above expressions combined to (10) and (11) solve for and Am.
Wh — Ah i * . — Wh Am
Wm Am  h ’ H Wm I*h
Wm _  Am Wm Al
w l  -  a l  Il ’ *  Am _  w l  t t
Finally, I use a simulated method of moments to target Al so that (9) solves for the observed 
average wage for low educated workers in 1995. As result of this calibration, Al — 2.81; 
Am — 12.39 and Ah — 47.36, which implies that CHM(i) — In 3.82i and CML(i) — ln 4.42i.
The calibrated model using these parameters matches the initial moments in the data rel- 
atively well. Table 5 contains the results of the calibration for the targeted and non-targeted 
moments. The supply of skills and average wages in 1995 are used to calibrate the model, so that 
its values perfectly match that of the model. The average task performed by each educational 
level and the overall distribution of occupations are not targeted in the model. According to 
the model the average task of low educated workers is 0.21 in 1995, while in the data it is 0.24, 
while the average tasks in 1995 for medium and high educated are slightly overestimated in the 
model.37 The model matches that occupations of lower ranking (bottom-third) have the higher 
share of employment in the economy, while employment in higher rank occupations where high 
educated workers are employed (top-third) have the lower share of employment. This results in 
the model from the optimal decisions of employers that is it profit maximizing to use the most 
productive workers in a larger range of tasks, diminishing the employment share on those tasks.
The inequality of the wage distribution in the model is, as expected, lower than that of the 
data, given that in the model there is no inequality within each educational group. The Gini 
index in the model is 30 percent lower than that of the data, but the level of inequality in the 
model is higher than the between component of the Theil and the Atkinson(2) indexes. The 
model does a better job on fitting different indexes of wage poverty with a poverty line of $2.4. 
Although the model cannot capture the level of inequality at a given point in time because it 
only produces three different wages for the total workforce, it is useful to understand changes 
in inequality that arise from variations in these wages and in the share of workers that earns 
them.
7 Results
7.1 Wage distribution and occupational structure
This section compares changes in labor market outcomes in the Brazilian data between 1995 and 
2014 with the predictions of the model when the Brazilian educational expansion takes place, 
holding constant the rest of the parameters of the model. I first discuss the qualitative results,
37I consider that the ranking of an occupation is informative of its complexity, such that a higher ranking 
occupations is more complex than a lower ranking occupation. In a strict sense, there is a correspondence 
between the ranking of the occupation and the index of task complexity in the model, but one index can be a 
monotonic transformation of the other, preserving the order but not necessarily the distance among each other.
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followed by a quantitative assessment of the model’s predictions arising from the calibrated 
model.
Table 6 displays the directional changes in the data for Brazil between 1995 and 2014, and 
the qualitative results of the model when there is an increase in the share of medium and high 
educated workers.38 The qualitative predictions of the model exactly match the changes ob- 
served in the data: the average complexity of the task performed by each type of worker declines 
(lower educational attainment for each educational group); the occupational composition of the 
workforce changes smoothly, so that the share of employment in tasks originally performed 
by high (low) educated workers increase (decrease) by less than the increase in the share of 
high educated workers (decline in the share of low educated workers); wages of low educated 
increases, wages of high educated workers decline, and changes in wages of medium educated 
workers are between those of low and high educated; and wage gaps of more educated workers 
with respect to less educated workers fall.
In the model, changes in the labor market can only arise from supply shocks or from tech- 
nological shocks. I showed that a supply shock as the one that took place in Brazil matches all 
the patterns observed in the data. It remains to be shown that changes in other parameters 
of the model cannot generate these patterns. In the model, if the productivity of all workers 
increases by the same ratio (factor-neutral technical change), there is no effect on the assign- 
ment of workers to tasks, and wages of all types increase in the same proportion, leaving wage 
gaps are unaffected. In the case of a skill-biased technological change, one the main factors 
influencing the labor markets during the 1990s in the United States and other developed coun- 
tries (Acemoglu 1998, Bekman et al. 1998) it is portrayed in the model by an increase in Ah . 
Although it generates a pattern of lower educational attainment for each group consistent to 
what is observed in the data, it also generates an increase in wages of high educated workers, 
which is not consistent with the data. The only technological change that can reduce the wage 
gaps is an increase in the productivity of low educated workers Al , but it would also imply oc- 
cupational upgrading instead of lower educational attainment: less educated workers will start 
to perform tasks of higher complexity. In short, only an educational expansion can generate the 
patterns on occupations and wages observed in the data in the context of the model.
I turn now to the quantitative assessment of the effects of an educational expansion through 
the lens of the model. To this end, I estimate the changes in several outcomes of interest in the 
calibrated model generated by the educational expansion that took place in Brazil, that is: l 
decrease from 0.68 to 0.36, m increases from 0.21 to 0.40, and h goes from 0.11 to 0.24. Table 
7 presents the changes in the occupational structure of employment and the wage distribution. 
The table compares the changes observed in the data between 1995 and 2014 and that of the 
model before an after the educational expansion. The objective of this exercise is to estimate 
how much of the changes in the data can be predicted by the model when only the educational 
level of the workforce increases as it did in Brazil while all other parameters (technology) are
38Section 5 describe two possible scenarios when both m and h increases, depending on whether IH increases or 
decreases. Given that in the quantitative exercise IH declines and that the sufficient condition for IH to decline 
(A  m <  0) is not meet in the data, only that case is relevant here.
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held constant. The last column of the table shows the percentage in which the model fits the 
changes data for each case.
I found that the model’s predictions of the effect of an educational expansion are remarkably 
accurate. The model is not only able to predict the qualitative changes but it also makes a close 
quantitative prediction of the observed changes in most of the outcomes of interest.
Changes in the average ranking of occupations in the model follow closely that of the data: 
there was lower educational attainment for all educational groups, and it was larger for medium 
educated workers. For medium educated workers, the average occupational ranking declines 
by 0.126 in the model compared to 0.128 in the data. For high educated workers, the average 
ranking declines by 0.042 in the model and by 0.057 in the data. The model predicts a somehow 
larger decrease in the average task of low educated workers (0.083) than the one observed in 
the data (0.037). Part of the reason is that the model cannot explain the decline in the share 
of employment in agriculture that is due to some structural change taking place during these 
years, which decreased the share of low educated workers in agricultural-related occupations 
that are at the bottom of the ranking.39 Overall, the model explains 66 percent of the decline 
in educational attainment within each educational group that took place during this period.
With respect to the overall composition of employment, the general prediction of the model 
is that changes in the occupational composition of the workforce are smooth in comparison with 
the large educational expansion that took place. The model predicts larger changes than the ones 
in the data, but the same qualitative results (a decline in bottom-third and an increase in the top 
third occupations). When the educational expansion takes place, high and medium educated 
workers moved down to tasks of lower complexity, implying that, not all the new high and 
medium educated workers find a job in the same tasks they used to carry out before, smoothing 
the changes in the overall occupational composition of employment. The model predicts, on 
average, around 40 percent of the changes in the overall composition of employment.
In the case of real wages, the model predicts, on average, 91.1 percent of the changes overall 
and for each educational group. Average wages rise 29.3 percent in the model and 27.8 percent 
the data; wages of low educated workers increase 46.9 percent in the model compare to 37.3 
percent in the data; wages of medium educated workers decline 10.9 percent in the model and
10.5 percent in the data; and wages of high educated workers decrease 22.2 percent in the model 
and by 21.6 percent in the data. The model predicts that wages of medium educated workers 
decrease less than wages of high educated workers, which is precisely what we observe in the 
data. Obviously, the changes in the wage gaps follow directly from the changes in wages, which 
the model predicts in the same precise way (92.5 percent on average). Wage gaps of medium to 
low falls 39.4 percent in the model and 34.8 percent in the data. Similarly, wage gaps of high to
39Structural change may also be driven, in part, by an educational expansion. Consider a model with two 
sectors, agriculture and non-agriculture. In the agriculture sector labor productivity declines with the number of 
workers in that sector. The non-agricultural sector produces a final good combining an infinite number of task, 
as in the model presented here. Low educated workers can be employed in the agriculture sector or in tasks of 
low complexity in the non-agricultural sector. A n  educational expansion as the one that happened in Brazil may 
increase the wages of low educated workers in tasks of lower complexity in the non-agricultural sector, pulling 
workers out of agriculture. To build this model is part of my research agenda.
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médium declines 12.7 and 12.4 in the model and the data respectively. Finally, the wage gaps 
of high to low declines 47.0 percent in the model and 42.9 percent in the data.
Welfare changes in the model are somehow distinct from those in the data. Figure 10 
shows the growth incidence curve of the wage distribution for Brazil between 1995 and 2014. 
Although the GIC is above zero for all the percentiles in the data, in the model wages decline 
for some percentiles at the top-end of the wage distribution. This is the case of the percentiles 
that originally where high educated and for which wages decreased. It is also the case of 
some percentiles that remained medium educated, for which wages decline as well. Despite 
these differences, the model predicts similar magnitudes of changes in wages for the first 70 
percentiles. One reason for this discrepancy is that there is a larger dispersion in wages among 
high educated workers, so when more people are added to that category the percentage of the 
populations that earns higher wages does not necessary diminishes even when the mean of the 
wage distribution of high educated workers declines.
Changes in inequality and poverty in the model are also close to that of the data. In the 
case of inequality, Figure 11 displays the Lorenz curves for Brazil in the data (Panel A) and 
in the model (Panel B). The Lorenz curve in 2014 is always above the one in 1995, which 
implies that any index of relative inequality decreased during this period. The same pattern is 
observed in the model. In terms of specific indexes of inequality, the Gini coefficient declined 
0.085 points in the data and 0.082 in the model. The reduction in the Theil index is also 
similar, but the between education groups (that may be more comparable to the changes in 
the model) is overestimated. This is not the case in the Atkinson index with the inequality 
aversion parameter equal to 2, which puts more weight to changes at the bottom of the wages 
distribution. In this case, the between inequality declined 0.078 in the data while in the model 
it decreased 0.088.40 The fact that the fit of the model is better for the changes in the Atkinson 
(2) than in the Theil index is consistent with the model not being able to capture some of 
the movement at the top of the income distribution related to the dispersion of wages among 
high educated workers. Taking the average fit of the model over the changes in the indexes of 
inequality, the model predicts 85 percent of the observed changes.41
The generalized increase in wages at the bottom of the wage distribution reduced poverty 
in the data and the model. Wages for the percentiles that remained low educated increased 
and wages rose even more for those percentiles that switched from low to medium and high 
education. This represents the bottom 70 percent of the wage distribution in the model (the 
percentage that originally was low educated). However, the changes in the poverty rate in the 
model are overestimated given its sensitivity to different poverty lines when it moves above or 
below the wage level of any group. The model better predicts changes in the poverty gap— 
FGT(1)— and the depth of poverty— FGT(2). On average, the model fits 68.4 percent of the 
changes in wage poverty in Brazil measure by FGT(0)-FGT(2).
40In the model there is no within groups inequality, therefore total inequality is equal to between-group in- 
equality.
41If only the between components and the Gini index is taking into account, the fit of the model diminishes 
slightly to 68.4.
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Although the model accurately predicts most of the patterns in the occupational structure 
of employment and the wage distribution observed in Brazil between 1995 and 2014, it has 
some limitations to predict the year by year changes in a satisfactory way. Figure 12 shows the 
evolution of key variables and the predictions from the model. Brazil had a financial crisis in 
1999 that lasted until 2003. The average wages during this period dropped overall and for the 
three educational groups. The model does not contain any structure to analyze business cycles 
so it is expected to perform poorly during this period. However, the crises mainly affected the 
levels of real wages, but it can be argued that the wage ratios where less affected if the crisis 
equally hurt workers with any educational level. This seems to be the case because even during 
this period the model closely predicts the evolution of wage gaps.
In summary, the relatively simple assignment model developed and calibrated in this paper 
allows isolating the effects of an increase in the education level of the workforce on occupations 
and the wage distribution when all the other factors, such as technology and educational quality, 
are held constant. This exercise resulted in estimations that follow very closely the observed 
changes in the data, providing evidence that the educational expansion in Brazil was the main 
factors behind the changes in the labor market between 1995 and 2014.
7.2 Output changes and the declining effects of an educational expansión
An expansion in education has distributional effects by changing the wages and shares of work- 
ers with different educational levels. It also affects the amount of output produced because 
more educated workers are more productive in the tasks that they start to perform after the 
educational expansion. In this section, I evaluate whether the model is informative with re- 
spect to changes in output per worker that took place in Brazil. Then, I evaluate different 
counterfactuals to study the differences between an increase in education in 1995 and in 2014.
The trend in output per worker is correctly captured by the model. Figure 13 shows the 
evolution of output per worker in Brazil and in the calibrated model.42. Output per worker in 
Brazil increased 18 percent between 1995 and 2014 and 15 percent in the model, accounting 
for 82 percent of its changes.43 This result suggests that the large investment in education in 
Brazil resulted in a considerably higher output.44
Despite the large effect of education on output during the period 1995-2014, I find that 
further increases in education are predicted to have a much lower impact. I estimate the effects 
of an increase in 1 percentage point in the share of medium or high educated workers in 1995 
and 2014. The results are in table 8. I found that an increase of 1 percentage point in the 
share of medium educated in 1995 raised output 0.1 percent and average wages in 0.5 percent. 
However, the same increase in 2014 slightly declines output and increases average wages by only
42 Output per workers is measured as the coefficient of gross domestic product and the number of employed 
workers. The statistics are taken from World Development Indicators (W DI)
43Changes in average productivity in the model can be estimated from (1) .
44M y estimation may underestimate the real impact in economy-wide productivity if a more abundant supply 
of high educated workers might lead to skill-based technological change (Acemoglu 2002) , or increases in human 
capital might generate positive externalities in terms of productivity that are not taken into account here, such 
as reduction of crime and better democratic institutions in the long term (Moretti 2004 a) .
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0.1 percent, five times lower than in 1995.45 In the case of an increase in 1 percent point of high 
educated workers, output and average wages increase by 1.8 and 2.3 percent, respectively, in 
1995. The same increase in high education in 2014 leads to a rise in output of 0.7 percent and 
in the average wage of 1.1 percent. These are still sizable effects, but they account for between 
half and one-third of the impacts in 1995.46
The previous result implies that further increases in secondary schooling might not continue 
to foster increases in output and average wages. This result must interpret with caution for 
several reasons. First, in order to increase h without reducing m, as implied in the last two 
columns in Table 8, the share of workers with at least secondary education has to increase 
as fast as h (otherwise there would be a decline in m). Second, it does not necessary means 
that the government should stop investing in secondary schooling. Instead, It shows that only 
investing in secondary schooling will have a small impact on output, given the restrictions on 
the demand side by holding the technology constant. The fact that there is rapid decline to 
how much an extra percentage of medium or high educated workers can contribute to output 
if the demand side does not change implies that policy makers have to focus on both. Finally, 
the effects on wages or output estimated here do not have to be interpreted as social returns 
to education. It is a well know fact that education generates several positive externalities that 
might be difficult to quantify, including (but not limited to): decrease in crime, positive effects 
in health, and better family planning.47
7.3 Robustness Check
The comparative advantages across tasks are crucial for estimating the labor market effect of 
an educational expansion, as discussed in Section 5.5. Therefore, the results presented above 
are sensitive to the calibration procedure. In this section, I evaluate different alternatives to 
calibrate the parameters of interest. I show that the results are robust to using these alternatives. 
First, I show the results change little when other years are used to calibrate the model instead 
of 1995 data. Secondly, I discuss whether the linear assumption for aL(i), aM(i) and aH(i) is 
reasonable according to the patterns observed in the data.
In principle, any year could be used to calibrate the parameters AL, AM and AH as in 
Section 6. Figure 14 shows the value of the productivity parameters with respect to 1995, when 
parameters are estimated for every year separately, using data on wages and skill supplies from 
each year. All productivity parameters decreased around 25 percent between 1995 and 2004,
45The decrease in output takes place because in the calibrated model médium educated workers are starting 
to perform tasks for which low educated workers have an absolute advantage. In reality, it could be the case 
that after a certain task i, low and medium educated workers are equally productive, and output will no longer 
change with an educational expansion when medium educated workers start to perform tasks i <  i.
46The changes in real wages for each group and in relative wages are similar in 1995 than in 2014. But the 
share of people affected by these changes is very different. For example, an increase in m in 2014 will decrease 
wages of 2 /3  of the workforce while it only decreased wages on 1 /3  in 1995. The educational composition of the 
workforce in the baseline year matters when estimating the effect of an educational expansion on output and 
average wages, even when the effects in the wage gaps are very similar in different years (there is a movement 
along the curves of comparative advantage in Figure 6) .
47See Moretti (20046) for a detail discussion on human capital externalities.
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and increase thereafter reaching similar levels in 2014 with respect to 1995. These patterns 
are consistent with the precise predictions of the model for wage levels in 2014— assuming that 
productivity was constant between 1995 and 2014— and the lack of precision for the years in 
between.The model seems to be better suitable to explain changes over an extensive period of 
time because it lacks the flexibility to accommodate short-term effects related to the business 
cycle, e.g. financial crises. This is an important limitation of the model given that business 
cycles in Latin America (including Brazil) tend to be more pronounced than in other regions of 
the world (Mejia-Reyes 1999) . However, it is worth noticing that because all the productivity 
parameters tend to move in the same direction and extent, the ratios AM/AL and AH/AM do 
not change much during the analyzed period. These ratios determine the assignment of workers 
to tasks in the model, as well as the relative wages. This is the reason why the model does a 
better job at predicting the trends in relative wages than in real wages throughout the analyzed 
period.
To evaluate the sensibility of the results to different values of the parameters AL, AM and 
Ah , I compare the results for four different alternatives: 1) the base calibration from 1995; 2) 
the mean value of the series 1995-2014; 3) the minimum value of the series 1995-2014; and 4) the 
maximum value of the series 1995-2014. The results are shown in Table 9. From looking across 
the columns of the table, I find that the initial and final thresholds estimated in the model do 
not change much under the different calibrations. Note that the wages of 1995 are no longer 
targeted under estimations 2-4. More importantly, the predictions of proportional changes in 
real wages, relative wages, occupations within each educational group and overall distribution 
of occupations are robust to the different calibration exercises. What matters for estimating 
these effects are the ratios AM/AL and AH/AM, which are similar across all specifications.
The second assumption that I discuss here is whether the linearity for aL(i), aM(i) and aH(i) 
is consistent with the data when the assumption of no change in productivity holds. Yearly 
data on wage gaps and skill supplies allows estimating year-by-year changes on thresholds levels 
according to Section 6. Let cJ be equal to exp(Cj). Then, It is possible to estimate cHM(IH) 
and cML(IL) for the different thresholds and to check whether these points lie on a linear curve. 
We can then define:
cHM (IHt) Ah aH (iHt)AM aM(IHt) ’ cML(ILt)
AM aM(ILt)
Al aL(lLt) ’
fo r t  =  {1995,..., 2014}.
The identifying assumption in Section 6 was = OLlíIlí) = i. f  this assumption is
consistent with the data, the points estimated by the model should lie close the curve with no 
constant and with the slopes estimated in Section 6. Figure 15 shows the results of this exercise. 
In the case of the curve cML(i), the points lie very close to the estimated curve. However, in the 
case of cHM(i) it seems that the slope is larger than the one predicted by the model, and it goes 
mostly below the points estimated year by year. There are two reasons why the curve may not 
fit very well the points in the data. First, the assumption of the function aH(Ih)/aM(Ih ) =  i is 
accurate, but AH may also be changing. Second, the function aH(Ih )/aM(Ih ) is misspecified
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and should be approximated by a linear function with a constant (c+ bi). I checked how sensible 
the results are to the linear function being misspecified. To that end, I considered each of the 
yearly estimated points as an observation in an OLS regression. The result is a linear function 
that minimizes the sum of the quadratic distance of the points to the linear function. This 
exercise provides an alternative estimation for cHM (i) and cML(i) based on the data of the 
entire period. Figure 16 shows the predictions of the model in some key variables when this 
calibration is used. The results do not significantly differ from those in Figure 12.
The main take away from this exercise is that the results are robust to using different 
functional forms for the productivity schedules across tasks that are also consistent with the 
data. A reason for this is that in Brazil the threshold Ih did not diminish much since both m 
and h increased during this period.48 Therefore, moderate changes in the functional form of 
the curve CHM(i) have a small impact on the results.
Although the specific value of some models’ prediction changes when using alternatives 
years to calibrate the model or different curves that may fit the data better, the same general 
conclusion holds: the model matches very closely the changes in the occupational structure of 
employment and in the wage distribution.
8 Conclusions
The educational level of the workforce is increasing rapidly in most countries. This paper 
developed a novel theoretical and empirical framework to study the effects of an educational 
expansion on the occupational structure of employment and the wage distribution. I applied 
the framework to Brazil, a country that underwent a major educational expansion between 
1995 and 2014. I proceed in three steps. First, I showed the interlinks between education- 
occupations-and wages in Brazil. Second, I developed a theoretical model that traces changes 
in occupations and wages to different educational expansions. Third, I calibrated the model to 
quantitatively assess how much of the observed changes in the data can be explained by the 
educational expansion.
In the first part of my paper, I found that along with an educational expansion, the following 
patterns are present in Brazil: the occupational structure of employment was relatively fixed, 
there was lower occupational attainment for each educational group, wages for workers with 
primary education increased, wages of more educated workers declined, wage gaps and other 
indexes of inequality fell, and poverty diminished. In the second part, I use an assignment 
model were workers with three levels of education are sorted across a continuum of occupations 
that vary in complexity and are combined to produce a final good. I investigated the effects of 
different policy experiment in the model, showing that it predicts qualitatively all the observed 
labor market changes in the occupational structure of employment and the wage distribution in 
Brazil when an educational expansion as the one observed in the data takes place. Next, I cali­
brated the model using the data from 1995 to find that the educational expansion quantitatively
48It went from 0.66 to 0.58, compared to a decline twice as big in IL from 0.42 to 0.26.
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predicts most of the observed changes in Brazil. I conclude that the increase in educational 
attainment was of utmost importance to the changes in the Brazilian labor market in the last 
two decades. Finally, I also found that further educational expansions in Brazil are predicted 
to have a much lower impact than in the past if they are not accompanied by other reforms 
aimed to change the technology of the economy.
The framework presented here can be used to study the labor markets effects of an educa- 
tional expansion in other countries as well. It can also be used to evaluate ex-ante the general 
equilibrium effects of a particular policy aimed to increase the educational level of one particular 
group of the population. Finally, it can be generalized to more groups, and it can be used to 
evaluate the general equilibrium effects of other supply shocks, such as an increase in the share 
of immigrants with a specific level of human capital (low or high).
My results reassert educational expansions as a key driver of economic development. In 
the case of Brazil, it largely improved the income distribution by reducing poverty and in- 
equality, and it raised the total output of the economy. But educational expansions should be 
accompanied by policies directed to increase the job opportunities in occupations where more 
educated workers can exploit the productivity differentials that they have obtained through ed- 
ucation. Otherwise, more educated workers will end up in occupations where schooling added 
adds little value to workers’ their productivity, undermining their additional effect on economic 
development.
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F ig u r e  1: C h a n g e s  in  e n ro llm e n t  ra tes  in  B ra z il
(a) Across countries comparison (1990-2010) (b) Historical comparison
Notes: Panel (a) shows the changes in enrollment rates across countries between 1990 
and 2010 in secondary and university/tertiary education. Panel (b) shows the historical 
evolution of enrollment rates for primary, secondary and university education in Brazil. 
Enrollment ratios are defined as the ratio of students at a given level of schooling in the 
designated age group to the total population of that age group.
Source: Barro & Lee (2013) .
Figure 2: Cumulative Density function of the wage distribution in 1995 and 2014
Notes: The figure shows the cumulative density function of real wages expressed in 
dollars at 2005 PPP in Brazil for the years 1995 and 2014.
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F ig u r e  3: C h a n g e s  in  th e  o c c u p a t io n a l  c o m p o s it io n  o f  th e  w o r k fo r c e  1 9 9 5 -2 0 0 4
Notes: Occupations at 3 digit level from ISCO-88 are ranked according to their median 
wage from lower to higher in the horizontal axis. The blue line (circle) in the figure is 
a locally weighted smoothing regression of the changes in employment shares (percent 
points) across the occupational ranking based on the median wage of each occupation 
over the period 1995-2014. The red line (triangle) displays a counterfactual change in 
the occupational composition of employment between 1995 and 2014 if the occupational 
composition within each educational group is fixed to the levels of 1995.
Figure 4: Occupational downgrading for each educational group between 1995-2014
Notes: The figure plots a locally weighted smoothing regression of the changes in em­
ployment shares (percent points) across the occupational ranking based on the median 
wage of each occupation over the period 1995-2014. Workers are classified into low 
(less than secondary), medium (some secondary), and high educated (some university). 
Occupations are ranked as in Figure 3 .
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F ig u r e  5: E q u il ib r iu m  in  th e  m o d e l
Notes: The figure shows an infinite number of tasks in the horizontal axis indexed by its level 
of complexity from 0 (the less complex tasks) to 1 (the most complex tasks) and the relative 
productivity in the vertical axis. The function Chm (i) represents the comparative advantage of 
high with respect to medium educated workers at task i and CML(i) is the comparative advantage 
of medium relative to low educated workers at task i , both are increasing in i by assumption. The 
threshold levels IL and IH determine the task performed by low (L ), medium (M ) and high educated 
(H ). In equilibrium, Chm(Ih) (Cml(Il)) equals relative wages if high and medium educated 
workers (medium and low educated workers) otherwise employers can profit from switching workers 
across occupations.
Figure 6: Effects of an educational expansión
(a) Panel A: Policy experiment (i) (Ah) (b) Panel B: Policy experiment (ii) (Am)
Notes: The figure shows the theoretical effects of an educational expansion on the assignment of 
workers' type to task and relative wages. Panel A shows to the effect of policy experiment (i) 
consisting of an increase in the share of high educated workers and a corresponding decrease in 
low educated workers. Panel B displays the effects of policy experiment (ii) increasing the share of 
medium educated workers by a corresponding decline in low educated workers.
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F ig u r e  7: C u m u la t iv e  d e n s ity  fu n c t io n  (C D F )  b e fo r e  a n d  a fte r  e a ch  p o l i c y  e x p e r im e n t
(a) Panel A : Policy experiment (i) (Ah >  0) (b) Panel B: Policy experiment (ii) (A to >  0)
(c) Panel C: Policy experiment (iii.a) (Ah  dominates) (d) Panel D: Policy experiment (iii.b) (Am  domintes)
Notes: The figure shows the Cumulative Density Function (inverted) of the distribution of wages 
before and after the educational expansion under the different policy experiments.
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F ig u r e  8: G r o w th  in c id e n c e  c u r v e  o f  d iffe re n t t y p e  o f  e d u c a t io n a l  e x p a n s io n s
(a) Panel A : Policy experiment (i) (Ah >  0) (b) Panel B: Policy experiment (ii) (A to >  0)
(c) Panel C: Policy experiment (iii.a) (Ah  dominates) (d) Panel D: Policy experiment (iii.b) (Am  domintes)
Notes: The figure shows the wage change (in absolute value) after different types of educational 
expansions at each percentile of the wage distribution. It is the difference between the curves Before 
and After  from Figure 7.
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F ig u r e  9: F o u r  d iffe re n t s ce n a r io s  o f  c o m p a r a t iv e  a d v a n ta g e  sch e d u le s
ative advantage across tasks (i). Parameters are chosen such that initial IH and IL are the same 
scenario (depicted by a point at the intersection of the flat and steep comparative advantage).
Figure 10: Growth incidence curve: Data and model
Notes: The figure shows absolute changes in wages for each percentile of the wage 
distribution. The blue line (circle) depicts the changes observed in the data between 
1995 and 2014. The red line (diamond) shows the predicted changes in the model before 
and after the Brazilian educational expansion.
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F ig u r e  11: C h a n g e s  in  re la t iv e  in e q u a lity : L o r e n z  C u rv e s
(b) Model: Before and after the educational expan- 
(a) Brazil: 1995 and 2015 sion
Cumulative workforce proportion
'  Í.U 11
Notes: Panel (a) shows Lorenz curves for Brazil in 1995 and 2014. Panel (b) shows the 
Lorenz curves in the calibrated model before and after the educational expansion.
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F ig u r e  12: D a t a  v s  m o d e l  p r e d ic t io n s : w a g e s  y e a r  b y  y e a r
Notes: The figure shows the evolution of wages and wages gaps labor market outcomes 
in the data and in the model year by year. The model simulates expansions in education 
as the one that took place year by year in Brazil, holding all the other parameters in 
the model constant at the levels of 1995.
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Figure 13: Evolution of output per worker in the data and in the model
Notes: The figure shows the evolution of output per worker in the data for Brazil. 
Output per worker is defined as GDP over employ workers. obtained from the World 
Development Indicators (2017). Output per worker in the model is defined as the total 
amount of the final good that is produced according to equation (1) in the calibrated 
model and taking into account the yearly changes in skill supplies from the data.
Figure 14: Calibration of productivity parameters year by year
exercise is performed separately using year by year data on the share of workers with 
different educational level and their average wages.
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F ig u r e  15: C o m p a r is o n  o f  1995  c a l ib r a t io n  v s  y e a r  b y  y e a r  c a l ib r a t io n
model using the average wages and educational levels of each year.
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F ig u r e  16: D a ta  v s  m o d e l  p r e d ic t io n s  w ith  a lte r n a t iv e  c a l ib r a t io n  : w a g e s  y e a r  b y  y e a r
Notes: The figure shows the evolution of wages and wages gaps labor market outcomes 
in the data and in the model year by year as in Figure 12. In this case, the calibration 
of the comparative advantage parameters is obtained by the O LS regressions over the 
points depicted in Figure 14 instead of using the data on 1995.
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T a b le  1: C h a n g e s  in  th e  e d u c a t io n a l  a t ta in m e n t  o f  th e  w o r k fo r c e  a n d  th e  B ra z ilia n  w a g e  d is tr i-
b u t io n  b e tw e e n  1 9995  a n d  201 4
Notes: The table shows the levels and changes in the educational attainment of the 
workforce and in different outcomes of the wage distribution estimated from PN AD  
1995 and 2014.
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T a b le  2: C h a n g e s  in  th e  o c c u p a t io n a l  s tr u c tu r e  o f  e m p lo y m e n t  in  B ra z il  b e tw e e n  1 9995  a n d  201 4
Notes: Occupations ISCO -88 1 digit: Occupations are classified according to ISCO -88 at 1-digit level except for agriculture and elementary 
occupations that are shown together. Occupations ISCO -88 3-digit: I construct a ranking of occupations classified by ISCO-88 3 digit (a total 
of 82 occupations) based on their median wage over the period 1995-2014.Three categories ISCO -88 3 digit: 82 occupations are divided into 3 
groups of an equal number of occupations according to their average wage. Bottom-third refers to the 27 occupations with lower average wage, 
medium-third are the next 27, and the remaining 28 are classified as top-third occupations. Workers are classified into low (less than secondary), 
medium (some secondary), and high educated (some university).
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T a b le  3: S u m m a ry  o f  th e  la b o r  m a rk e t  e ffe c ts  o f  d iffe re n t e d u c a t io n a l  e x p a n s ió n
Notes: The table shows the theoretical predictions of the model under four different policy experiments. Policy experiment (i) 
consists of an increase in high education. Policy experiment (ii) refers to increase in medium education. Policy experiment (iii) 
refers to an increase in both medium and high, and it is further separated between case (iii.a) when the threshold IH declines, 
and case (iii.b) when the threshold IH increases. The share of low educated workers is reduced by the same amount in all policy 
experiments. t  denotes an increase for any value in the parameters of the model; X denotes a decrease; tX denotes that it can 
increase or decrease. Other cells are filled with lower or upper bound to changes in the outcome variable. * Given by assumption.
Table 4: A numerical example on the differential effect of Ah for different scenarios of compar­
ativa advantage across tasks.
Notes: The table shows the theoretical predictions of the model under four different 
scenarios of comparative advantage across tasks. All scenarios start with the same 
thresholds IL and IH , and simulate the effect of an increase in 10 percentage points in 
the share of high educated (and a corresponding reduction in the share of low educated). 
Column one shows the scenario when both comparative advantage schedules are flat, 
that is, they barely increase with the complexity of the task denoted by i. Column 
two displays the scenario of steep comparative advantage schedules. Columns 3 and 4 
show a combination of steep and flat comparative advantage schedules. Parameters are 
calibrated so that initial wages and thresholds are the same in each column.
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T a b le  5: In it ia l m o m e n ts  in  th e  d a ta  (1 9 9 5 ) a n d  th e  m o d e l
Notes: Estimations for Brazil comes from PN AD  1995. The model is calibrated for the year 1995 
according to Section 6 . 82 occupations at ISCO-88 3 digit level are ranked from 0 to 1 according to 
its median wage for the period 1995-2014. The average ranking is computed for each educational 
group. Bottom-third refers to the 27 occupations with lower average wage, medium-third are next 
27, and the remaining 28 are classified as top-third occupations. Workers are classified into low (less 
than secondary), medium (some secondary), and high educated (some university).
52
T a b le  6: Q u a lita t iv e  o b s e r v e d  ch a n g e s  v s  m o d e l  p r e d ic t io n s
Notes: The table shows the qualitative changes in the labor market in Brazil during 
the years 1995-2014 and the changes predicted by the model under policy experiment 
(iii.a). The table contents should be interpreted as follows: t  denotes an increase for 
any value in the parameters of the model; | denotes a decrease; denotes that it can 
increase or decrease. Other cells are filled with lower or upper bound to changes in the 
outcome variable.
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T a b le  7: T h e  la b o r  m a rk e t  e ffe c ts  o f  a n  e d u c a t io n a l  e x p a n s ió n : d a ta  v s  m o d e l
Notes: Estimations for Brazil comes from PN AD  1995-2014. The estimations for the model comes from 
simulating the Brazilian educational expansion between 1995-2014 on the calibrated model, holding constant 
the rests of the parameters. The Brazilian educational expansion consists of: an increase in the share of 
medium educated from 20.5 to 40.0 percent, an increase in the share of high educated workers from 11.3 to 
23.6 percent, and a decline in the share of low educated workers from 68.1 to 36.4 percent.
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T a b le  8: D iffe re n t ia l e f fe c t  o f  a n  e d u c a t io n a l  e x p a n s ió n  in  1995  a n d  2 0 1 4
Notes: The table presents the results of simulating an increase of 0.01 in m or h in the 
model under the different equilibrium conditions arising from a low educated workforce 
in 1995 and a higher educated workforce in 2014. The results have to be interpreted 
as the predictions of the model of increasing the supply of skills by 1 percentage point 
while decreasing the share of low educated workers in the same magnitude.
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Table 9: Model results with different calibrations
Notes: Estimations for Brazil comes from PN AD  1995-2014. The productivity parameters of the model are 
calibrated in different ways, According to the values in Figure 14. The model simulates an educational expansion 
between 1995-2014 following Table 1. Workers are classified into low (less than secondary), medium (some 
secondary), and high educated (some university).
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A Appendix 1
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
The profit of a competitive firm producing tasks i is:49
n (i) =  p(i) (LaL(i)L(i) +  Am aM(i)M (i) +  Ahau(i)H (i)) -  wlL(í) -  wmM (i) -  whH(i),
where the price of the task p(i) and the wage of each type of worker are given for the firm. The 
first order conditions with respect to L(i), M(i), and H(i) imply
J(i) > 0 i f  nJ(i) = p(i)A jaj(i) -  wj > 0 for J = {L ,M ,H }.
Competition assures that n (i) <  0. Moreover, the Cobb-Douglas production function for 
the final good implies that production of all task is positive. So Vi it must be that either 
nL(i) =  0, or nM(i) =  0, or nH(i) = 0  or two of these conditions has to hold. Unemployment 
of any type of worker is not possible in this economy because it would imply that wages fall 
to zero and firms could make a profit in producing task i with that type. Then, a positive 
amount has to be produce of each task using either low, medium, or high educated workers. 
Therefore, given the assumption of increasing comparative advantage on i for more educated 
workers, there must exist two thresholds levels IL and IH (where 0 < IL < Ih < 1) such that: a) 
kl(í) -  nM (i) > 0 and ^l (í) -  nu (i) > 0 for all í<Il , kl(Il) -  km (Il) =  0; b) km (i) -  kl(í) > 0 
and km (i) -  nu (i) > 0 for all i = (Il , Ih ); c) km (Ih ) -  nu (Ih ) =  0; and d) nu (i) -  kl(í) > 0 
nH (i) -  nM (i) > 0 for all i > IH.
A.2 Derivations of the Equilibrium Conditions in the Model
The competitive equilibrium in the economy described in Section 5 consist in an assignment of 
workers’ type to tasks and real wages for each type of worker such that producers maximize 
profits and labor markets clear, given the relative supply of skills and the productivity across 
tasks of each type of worker. The equilibrium conditions in this model are similar to those in 
A&A. I keep the notation to a minimum and refer to A&A for a more detailed discussion.
The characterization of the equilibrium is simple given the positive assortative matching 
that arises from the structure of the model (supermodular production function). In particular, 
there exists two thresholds IL and IH that determines what tasks are performed by low(i <  IL), 
medium (IL < i < IH) and high educated workers (i >  IH). See Lemma 1 in Section 5 for a 
formal definition of the thresholds.
These thresholds naturally arise from the assumption that comparative advantage is in­
creasing in (i), generating positive assertive matching. Intuitively, it is optimal for employers 
to use the most productive workers (high educated) to the more complex task (closer to the 
index 1), where they have a larger comparative advantage. On the opposite, it is in their profit-
49The proof presented here follows the analisys in Acemoglu & Zilbotti (1999) .
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maximizing interest to employ low educated workers in the tasks of low complexity (closer to 0). 
And finally, medium educated workers will be employed in the remaining task with a medium 
level of complexity. The location of these thresholds depends on the relative supply of workers' 
types and on their relative productivities in each task, which are assumed to be exogenous. 
Prices
The final good is the numeraire of this economy, that is:
It implies that for two tasks i and i' that are produced using the same type of labor it must 
be the case that price differences exactly offset productivity differences. That is:
Because the technology of the production function is Cobb-Douglas, the expenditure across 
all task should be equalized (p(i)y(i) = p (i)y (i)  for any i,i'). It implies that for any two task 
produced by low educated workers, that is
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Workers with the same skills perform different tasks, but they will receive the same wage 
because of the competitive equilibrium assumption. Let wL, wM wH be the wage of low, medium 
and high educated respectively, it is possible to state:
(16)
Comparing now tasks performed by low educated workers and those of medium educated
workers, and using the fact that total expenditure of employers in each task has to be the same 
to maximize profits (because of the production is Cobb-Douglas), that is:
(21)
(22)
No arbitrage across skills
The cost of producing task Il with low or medium educated workers must be the same or 
employers could increase profits by using the less expensive worker in this task. Similar, to 
produce task Ih with medium and high educated workers must be the same. We can express 
these conditions as follows:
(23)
(24)
These equations provide a unique mapping between the thresholds IH and IL, and the 
relative supply and relative productivities of high and low educated workers across different 
tasks.
Equilibrium wages
Wages are equal to the value of the marginal products of different type of workers, that is:
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Using equations (17) , (19) , (18) , (20) ,
By using (20) ,
(25)
(26)
Wh  = Ph Ah  . (2 7 )
By equations 21 and 22, I get the following expression for relative wages:
(28)Wm _  Pm Am _  (Ih -  I I ) (1 -  h -  m) Wl PlAl Il m '
Wh _  Ph Ah _  (1 -  Ih ) (m)
Wm Pm Am Ih h
(29)
To finalize characterizing the equilibrium, it is necessary to compute price levels. Due to 
the choose of the numeraire, 0 lnp(i) di _  0 (from equation (16) ). By using equations (17) ,
(18) and (19) ,
This equations, together with (28) and (29) , solves for the price levels Pl , Pm and Ph . 
Having estimated prices, real wages are computed using (25) , (26) and (26) , and are equal to:
A.3 Proof of propositions 1-3
The proof of propositions (1), (2) and (3) proceeds as follows. First, I compute the thresholds’ 
changes that determine the distributions of workers’ types to tasks. Then, the effects on wages
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(34)
(35)
(36)
By taking the difference og the log wage equations, the wages gaps are then equal to:
and the overall distribution of occupations follow directly from the new thresholds.
Changes in task composition within each educational level
The task composition within each educational level is determined by the thresholds levels 
II and Ih . I use comparative statics to estimate the effects of an educational expansion on the 
thresholds levels.
Proof of (i.l). I follow A&A by expressing (5) and (6) in logs:
An increase in h leads to a reduction in both thresholds, given that higher educated workers 
start performing medium-level tasks, and medium educated workers are pushed towards lower- 
level tasks displacing low educated workers. With an increase in h, the average task performed 
by each educational level diminishes leading to conditional occupational downgrading.
Proof of (ii.l). Following a similar procedure it is possible to write:
(4 2 )
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Now consider the effect of a change in h by totally differentiating these equations. We thus 
obtain:
(37)
(38)
The inequality in the first equation is straightforward. For the second equation to be positive 
it is necessary that:
From (38) the RHS is <  0, because
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It is easy to see that with an increase in m the average task performed by low educated 
workers (IL/2 ) and that of high educated workers ((1 — IH)/2 ) will increase. The change in the 
average task performed by medium educated workers depends on the parameters of the model. 
Moreover, an increase in m leads to a larger share of tasks performed by medium educated 
workers, by increasing its participation in low-level and high-level tasks. We are also interested 
in since the average task performed by medium educated workers can be defined as
IL + (IH — IL)/2 = (IH +  IL)/2. Depending on which effect is stronger, PLl < 0 . The average
task performed by medium educated workers will increase or decrease depending on whether 
this inequality is positive or negative. We can write it as follows:
When m and h increase separately, IL always declines and IH increases in the first case and 
decreases in the second case. When m and h increase simultaneously there is a mixture of these 
effects. As a consequence, IL will diminish but IH can increase or decrease depending on what 
effect is stronger.
It means that IH cannot increase unless the relative supply of medium with respect to high 
educated workers also increases. However, this condition does not work in the other direction. 
Changes task composition of the economy 
In only a few cases the model provides a sharp prediction of the changes in the task com- 
position of the economy that does not depend on the parameters of the model.
Proof of (i.2) and (ii.2). When there is an increase in IH, some medium educated workers
will be added to tasks originally performed only by high educated workers. Therefore, the share 
of employment in high-level tasks in the economy will increase.
This inequality is written for the more general case in which m and h increases. Note that 
the inequality stills holds for proposition 2 when Ah =  0.
In the rest of the cases, when IH declines, it is only possible to define boundaries for the 
changes in the occupational composition of employment. For example,
The inequality establishes that when the share of low educated workers is reduced by Al, 
the share in bottom-level tasks will decline less than A l since some medium educated workers 
will start performing some of these tasks. The extent to which medium educated workers will 
start performing those tasks depends on the extent of the decline in Il , which at the same time 
depends on the comparative advantage schedules and whether the decline in l was due to an 
increase in m, h or both.
A similar result arises when looking at changes in employment for top-level occupations 
when Ih declines. Formally,
A decline in IH is only possible if Ah >  0. The inequality establishes that there is less 
increase in employment in top-level occupations than the increase in the share of high edu- 
cated workers. Some high educated workers start performing middle-level tasks. To study the 
determinants for an increase in employment in top-level tasks, it is possible to state that:
that is, the increase in the supply of high educated workers has to be large with respect to 
the change in the threshold IH .
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AEt = (h! -  h) -  (Ih -  IHh---- p- < Ah.
1 ah
Changes in the wages
We now turn to the case of changes in the wage levels. From the wage equations (7) , (8) 
and (9) the threshold levels determine the wage levels. After an educational expansion IL 
always falls, while IH can increase or decrease depending on the case. I consider these two cases 
separately.
Case 1: AIL < 0 and AIH < 0
Proof of proposition (i.3).. After an educational expansion, wages for high educated workers 
can be expressed as:
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where the inequalities for each term comes from the assumption about the comparative 
advantage schedules. Given the comparative and absolute advantage schedule, Cm l(Il) > 
Cm l(í) > Cm l(IL) for all i = (I'L, Il) and Ch m (Ih ) > Ch m (i) > Ch m (I'h ) for all i =  (I'H, Ih ) 
. I can establish the following inequalities:
a n d
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Changes in relative wages
Relative wages are easy to estímate in the model. Their level depends on the changes in the 
thresholds and are equal to the difference of the equations stated above (alternatively, they can 
be obtained directly from equations (10)- (12)) .
Proof of (i.4) and (ii.4). Relative wages can be expressed as follows.
I find that in any educational expansion the wage gap between medium and low educated 
workers always fall according to the model. This is the case because medium educated workers 
will always start performing bottom-level tasks when there is an educational expansion (decline 
in IL), and the productivity differential of medium with respect to low educated workers always 
decline, and this is what defines the wage gaps.
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B Online Appendix
B.1 Estimations of Changes in Quality of Human Capital
When the access to education increases rapidly in a country, it is possible that the quality of 
education or the unobserved ability of people being educated diminished. If that is the case, the 
quantity of human capital after the educational expansion may be lower for a given educational 
attainment.
In this section, I evaluate whether the observed changes in wages of medium and high 
educated workers are driven by market forces or by a change in the human capital that these 
educational levels represent. I follow Bowlus & Robinson (2012) and Heckman et al. (1998) 
by computing changes in the prices of human capital by looking into yearly changes in median 
wages of cohorts for which the quantity of human capital should have remained constant. I 
conclude that most of the changes in wages are due to changes in the price of human capital, 
providing support to the hypothesis that the decline of wages were driven by the market forces 
described in the previous sections.
In the theory and the model presented above, an educational level is equivalent to a quantity 
of human capital that the workers possess. In another strand of the literature related to human 
capital models, wages are defined as the product of efficiency units of human capital that each 
worker poses and its price. Let wit be the wage of worker i in time i, Xt be the market level 
price for human capital, and Eit be the quantity of human capital. It is possible to define
wt,i = XtEt,i.
Changes on median wages of workers between t and t' with educational level s from cohort 
c can be defined as:
This equation shows that change in median wages can be decomposed into a market price 
effect given by the first term and a human capital or quantity effect reflected in the second term. 
To estimate the incidence of each of these two terms in changes in wages, Heckman et al. (1998) 
look into changes in wages in cohorts for which the level of human capital does not change in 
time. In other words, they look into the age groups for which the quantity of human capital is 
assumed to remain constant so that the second term in the previous equation is equal to zero. 
Let define the cohorts of educational level s for which human capital remain constant from t to 
t'. The changes in prices for an educational group s can be defined as an average of the changes 
in prices for each cohort in the flat point like follows
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ln Median wt/,s,c — ln Median wt,s = ln \t>,s,c — ln \t,s,c +  ln Median Et',s,c — ln Median Et,s,c.
where n is the number of cohorts consider to be in the flat spot.
To find the ages groups, I follow Bowlus & Robinson (2012) who define it for similar years 
of potential experience for each educational groups, finding the "flat" point by looking into the 
cross-sectional life earning cycle of wages. I find that the life earnings cycle is flat in most 
years when looking into low educated between 43-52 years old, between 48-57 years for medium 
educated workers, and 50-61 for high educated workers.50. Table 10 replicates Table 1 in Bowlus 
& Robinson (2012) . A flat stop is found if earnings do not change with age. I found that to 
be the case for most of the years, except for the first four years for low educated workers. As 
indicated by Bowlus & Robinson (2012) , this could generate a downward bias in the price series 
of low educated workers, since the decline in prices for those years might be partly due to decline 
in the quantity of human capital. In this case, the price series I estimate can be interpreted as 
a lower bound.
The price series estimated with this method is displayed in Figure 17. Note that the evolution 
of prices is similar to the patters funded for median wages depicted in Figure 17. Once the price 
series is obtained, the quantity effect is estimated as the residual of wage effects minus the price 
effect.
Table 11 summarizes the results of this decomposition exercise for the period 1995-2014. I 
found that the price effects explain most of the changes in wages between 1995 and 2014. Most 
of the increase in wages for low educated workers and the decrease for high educated workers 
(97% and 84% respectively) is explained by the price effect. For medium educated workers, 
price effects are larger than the changes in wages, suggesting that the quantity of education 
embedded in medium educated workers is actually higher in 2014 than in 1995.
The evidence presented in this section is consistent with the theoretical model presented 
above where the changes are originated by market level effects as a response to changes in the 
supply of skills, and not due to education miss measuring the levels of skills. This evidence 
is also consistent with results from international standardize tests that find an increase in test 
scores during the 2000s.51. It has been a remarkable achievement for Brazil to have one of the 
largest educational expansions in history without decreasing the quality of education. However, 
this quality is still low to international standards and one of the main challenges that the 
educational system faces today is on increasing the quality.
50I perform this analysis only for men, working more than 35 hours a week. The reason to restrict the sample 
to men is that at this age range participation in the labor force decline rapidly for women, and price effect may 
be biased due to selection effects into the labor force
51Bruns et al. (2011) contain a detailed analysis of the evolution of test scores in Brazil when compared to 
other countries as a measure of the evolution of quality of education. The authors conclude that, although the 
scores are still far below O CD E levels, Brazil has made a fast and sustained progress during the 2000s.
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Table 10: Fiat point on earnings: Cross sectional evidence
Note: Each cell in the table shows the returns to an extra year of experience in a min- 
cer equation of low wages. The sample is restricted only to employed males. Workers 
are classified into low (less than secondary), medium (some secondary), and high edu- 
cated (some university). * Significant at 10 percent. ** Significant at 5 percent. ***  
Significant at 1 percent.
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F ig u r e  17: E v o lu t io n  o f  p r ice s  re la t iv e  t o  1995
Note: The figure shows the evolution of the price effect for low, médium and high 
educated workers. The price effect is estimated for male working more than 30 hours 
a week according to equation (44) . The flat spot age range is 43-52 for low educated, 
48-57 for medium educated, and 51-60 for high educated. Workers are classified into low 
(less than secondary), medium (some secondary), and high educated (some university).
Table 11: Decomposition of the changes in wages on price and quantity effects
Note: Median wages are estimated for males working more than 30 hours per week. 
Price effect is estimated from Figure 17. Quantity effect is the residual of the total 
change in median wages minus the price effect. Workers are classified into low (less 
than secondary), medium (some secondary), and high educated (some university).
70
B.2 Oaxaca Decomposition of Average Wages
This section evaluates the relationship between changes between 1995 and 2014 in average wages 
of each educational group and their occupational composition of employment. Wages for a given 
educational group may change in part because workers switched to occupations with a different 
wage, and in part because there was an increase or decrease in wages of occupations they were 
already performing. The Oaxaca decomposition disentangles the importance of these two effects 
on changes in average wages.
The changes in log wages between 1995 and 2014 can be decomposed by the method proposed 
by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) , and the role of occupations is obtained following Ferreira 
et al. (2016) . Let’s W? be the wage of individual i from the educational group s in time t and X  
be a vector of occupational dummies and other personal characteristics (gender and age group 
dummies). Then we can express:
Consider t =  1995,2015, it is possible to write a model with the two periods pooled together 
as follows:
The difference in average log wages between 1995 and 2014 can be written as:
where Áp and ÁC are, respectively, the estímate of the pay structure effect and the composition 
effect for group s. The first term, the composition effect, reflects the changes in average wages 
of the group s due to changes in the return to covariates X s. The second term, the composition 
effect, estimates the change in average wages that is due to changes in the distribution of 
covariates X s.
We are interested in studying how changes in returns and composition of occupations are 
related to changes in average wages. Let Xj be composed by 82 occupational dummies from 
ISCO-88-3 digit level classification, and X g be other covariates. Given the linearity of both 
the pay structure and the composition effect, it is easy to get the part of the effect driven by
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Let j  denote sample average of variable j , ¡3 denote ordinary last squares estimates of 
parameter ¡ ,  1 and 2 be 1995 and 2014 respectively, and w be log(W ). We can write the 
sample estimate of the above expression as:
occupations. It is possible to write:
Table 12 shows the results of the decomposition. The decomposition is performed for the 
entire workforce and for each educational group separately. In column (1) the vector of personal 
characteristics X  only incorporates occupational dummies. In Column (2) X  also contains 
dummies for combinations of gender, 4 age groups, and 6 levels of education, to account for 
changes in these characteristics for the entire workforce and within each educational group.
The results of the decomposition are stated as follows. For the entire workforce, the average 
log wage increased 0.382 between 1995 and 2014, mainly due to a general raise in wages within 
each occupation. The composition effect due to a change in occupations is small (only explains 
11 percent of the increase in wages), while most of the increase in wages comes from the pay 
structure effect. This is consistent with Section 4 where we stated that the occupational compo­
sition of the Brazilian economy did not change much during the period 1995-2014. The increase 
in average wages is mainly due to a generalized increase in wages across all occupations and a 
decline in the occupational premiums, reflected in the negative effects of occupational premiums 
in the pay-structure effect and the large positive change in the constant of the regression. These 
results are robust to incorporate other covariates into the decomposition (column (2)).
The decomposition exercise shows heterogeneous results for workers with different educa­
tional level. For low educated workers, the average wages increased due to small but negative 
composition effect and a large and positive pay structure effect. This indicates that they oc­
cupational composition deteriorated (they are more concentrated in low wage in 2014 when 
compared to 1995), but the wage level had a generalized increase (reflected in the constant) 
that more than compensate for the occupational downgrading. Note that the sign of the occu­
pation term in the pay structure effect is negative, indicating that the occupational premiums 
(with respect to the constant) declined. For medium educated workers, the composition effect 
was large and negative, and it was not compensated by a small and positive pay structure 
effect. It reflects that the occupational composition of medium educated workers deteriorated, 
and even when there was an increase in wages within each occupation it was not enough to 
compensate for the occupational downgrading. In the case of high educated workers, both the 
composition and the pay structure effect are negative, indicating that not only there was an 
occupational downgrading during this period but also that wages within each occupation de­
cline as well. The fact that the occupation term in the pay structure effect is positive shows
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that the occupational premiums increase (with respect to the constant that largely diminished). 
This is because wages fall for high educated workers in low wage occupations. The results for 
each educational level practically do not change when other covariates are incorporated into the 
decomposition (column (2)).
A better intuition of these results can be obtained from Figure 18. The figure displays a 
locally weighted smoothing regression of the changes in log wages between 1995 and 2004 on the 
ranking of occupations for all workers in panel (a) and for workers with different educational level 
in panel (b). From the first panel, it is clear that wages increased more in low wage occupations 
and occupational premiums declined. While the smoothing regression in the second panel shows 
that wages increased for all occupations in the case of low educated workers, only increased in 
occupations with a low ranking for medium educated workers, and wages declined for almost 
all occupations for high educated workers (except those at the top), and this decline was more 
pronounced in low ranked occupations.
In summary, this section decomposes the changes in wages during the period 1995-2014 be­
tween an occupational composition effect (changes in the occupational structure of employment) 
and a pay structure effect (changes in wages within occupations). We find that for all workers 
the composition effect is small, consistent with small changes in the occupational composition of 
the economy; while the increase in wages is driven by higher wages at each occupation, especially 
those that started with a lower wage. We also find that all educational levels experienced a 
negative occupational composition effect, consistent with conditional occupation downgrading. 
For low educated workers wages within each occupation largely increase, compensating for the 
negative composition effect, and average wages increased. For medium educated workers, wages 
increase only in a small number of occupations and it was not enough to compensate for the 
composition effect, so average wages decreased. For high educated workers, wages declined in 
each occupation, reinforcing the negative composition effect, and average wages fell.
These results are in line with to those of the model presented on Section 5 for the case that 
Ih declines, as was the case in the calibrated estimation in Section 7.1.52 In the model, an 
educational expansion generates a deterioration in occupations conditional on education, which 
is larger for medium educated workers; this is exactly what the composition effect indicates in 
the data. The model predicts a large increase in the price of occupations where low educated 
workers are employed, an mild change in prices of occupations performed by medium educated 
workers (can increase or decrease, but always between the changes in prices of low and high 
educated workers), and a sharp decline in the prices of occupations performed by high educated 
workers. These predictions are consistent with the heterogeneous pay structure effect that is 
observed in the data.
52In this discussion, I assume the tasks in the model can be directly interpreted as occupations. See Section 3 
for a detail discussion on occupations being interpreted as tasks
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T a b le  12: O a x a c a  d e c o m p o s it io n  o f  ch a n g e s  in  m e a n  w a g es
Note: The table presents the Oaxaca decomposition of average log wages between a composition effect and a pay structure 
effect, which are in turn decompose into the effect of occupations and those of other covariates. Column (1) only considers 
occupational dummies according to ISCO -88-3 digit level. Column (2) incorporates group dummies for combinations of 
gender, 4 age groups and 6 levels of education (GenderxEduxAge).
F ig u r e  18: C h a n g e s  in  lo g  w a g e s  b y  o c c u p a t io n . P e r io d  1 9 9 5 -2 0 1 4
Note: The figure plots a locally weighted smoothing regression of the changes in log 
wages between 1995 and 2004. Occupations are ranked as in Figure 3 . Source: Author’s 
calculation based on PN AD  1995 and 2004.
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